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ABSTRACT 
  
The Rwandan Genocide occurred between April and July of 1994. Within those four 
months, approximately a million Tutsi were brutally murdered by the Hutu in an effort to cleanse 
the country of a Tutsi presence. The genocide was the culmination of decades of unrest between 
the two groups created from Western influence under colonialism and post-colonial 
relationships. The international response to the genocide was scarce. While international 
intervention waned, the international media kept the genocide relevant in its publications. This 
thesis examines print media sources from the United States, Britain, and France. This thesis 
argues that the reporting of the genocide exacerbated larger issues concerning the relationship 
between the West and Africa. The journalists perpetuated Western superiority over Africa by 
utilizing racism to preserve colonial ideologies and stereotypes of Africans. In turn, this inherent 
Western racism complicated the implementation of human rights legislation that would have 
helped save Tutsi lives. This thesis places the Rwandan genocide, through the reports of Western 
media, into the larger historiographic context of the Western African dichotomy. 
 
  
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my mother, who never wavered in her support and admiration. 
 
  
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
  
I would like to thank my mother, Mary Tyrrell, who supported me throughout this project 
and never let me forget the pride I afforded her. I would also like to thank my father, Raymond 
Tyrrell. His memory always drove me to strive to my full potential.  
 
 I would like to express sincere gratitude to my committee members, who made this 
project possible and for their knowledge and guidance throughout my entire journey. Special 
recognition goes to my thesis chair, Dr. Ezekiel Walker, for his unwavering support, continued 
excitement of my research, and his guidance to those moments of clarity, when it all finally fell 
together. I would also like to thank Dr. Amelia Lyons for making me a better writer and a better 
historian though out the years; and Dr. Richard Crepeau for his excellent comments, especially 
during the formative stages of my thesis. Lastly, I would like to thank Zachary Morgan and 
Michael Brooks for their support and insight in this project, and embarking on this long journey 
together.   
 
  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONTEXT ........................................................ 1 
Historiography ............................................................................................................................ 2 
The Media and the International Community ............................................................................. 2 
Chapter Breakdown .................................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER ONE: THE COLONIAL LEGACY OF GENOCIDE ................................................. 9 
The Rise of European Colonialism and Colonial Legacy in Rwanda ...................................... 11 
Belgian Colonial Legacy and Western Perceptions of Africa .................................................. 21 
The Legacy of the French Relationship and Neo-colonialism .................................................. 27 
The Colonial Legacy on the West ............................................................................................. 33 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 36 
CHAPTER TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ............. 38 
The Birth of the Modern Human Rights Movement ................................................................. 40 
Responsibility ........................................................................................................................... 47 
International Responsibility .................................................................................................. 47 
The Case of France ............................................................................................................... 50 
Blame ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
The Case of the United States ............................................................................................... 54 
The United Nations ............................................................................................................... 59 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 63 
CHAPTER THREE: THE TERM GENOCIDE ........................................................................... 65 
A History of the Term “Genocide” ........................................................................................... 67 
Making the Situation Relatable: “Civil War” and Genocidal Implications .............................. 70 
Genocide versus civil war ..................................................................................................... 71 
Shock Value: The use of verbal imagery and emphasis on genocide ................................... 75 
The Use of Imagery .............................................................................................................. 76 
Relation to the Holocaust ...................................................................................................... 80 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 82 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 84 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 88 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONTEXT 
 
On the evening of 6 April 1994, unknown perpetrators shot down the plane carrying the 
president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, over Kigali, the capital of the country. In the 
following four months, between April and July of 1994, roughly 800,000 to one million innocent 
people lost their lives.
1
 This was not a sporadic outburst of violence, it did not stem from one 
plane crash. Rather, the Hutu majority had previously organized and planned attacks on the Tutsi 
in an effort to eradicate all Tutsi presence from the country. Within those four months, bands of 
Hutu extremists systematically hunted and murdered Tutsi civilians. These Hutu soldiers forced 
other Hutu to turn against neighbors, friends, and often times their own family, in an effort to 
cleanse the inyenzi
2
 problem within Rwanda. And when fellow Hutu refused to partake in the 
violence, or sought to help the Tutsi victims, the Hutu militias tortured and murdered them. The 
situation in Rwanda during the summer of 1994 rose to the level of genocide.
3
  
 Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UN peacekeeping force in 
Rwanda during the time of the genocide described Rwanda as “a stinking nightmare of rotting 
corpses, a nightmare we all had to negotiate every day.”4 The hundred day genocide which took 
place was atrocious and, at times, unfathomable. But what makes the Rwandan genocide even 
more horrific was that it took place in view of the international community. The perpetrators of 
the torture and killing did not hide their actions behind walls or in forests; the violence took 
place on the streets and in neighborhoods. The violence took place in view of journalists and 
                                                 
1
 Estimates vary. The estimates here are taken from Linda Melvern’s A People Betrayed and Daniela Kroslak’s The 
French Betrayal of Rwanda. 
2
 A Kinyarwanda word meaning “cockroach” used by the Hutu to describe the Tutsi. 
3
 In this work, the term genocide reflects the scholarly works used as a basis for this analysis. My understanding of 
the term genocide is largely based on Raphael Lempkin’s definition of the term. See Samantha Power, “A Problem 
from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide 42-45. 
4
 Dallaire, Romeo. Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, 1. 
 2 
television news crews. The small contingent of UN peacekeepers that remained in the country 
throughout the four months reported daily to the United Nations and world powers. Yet, the 
international leadership made little to no effort to end the killing, often getting too bogged down 
in bureaucratic misgivings and personal agendas. Humanity failed Rwanda during the summer of 
1994, and the consequences of that failure came at the costs of human life.  
 
The Media and the International Community 
 The Rwandan genocide is unique in the sense that it was not hidden out of the sight of the 
international community. The genocide took place in the streets of Rwanda, in villages and at 
roadblocks. And the media was present during the entire genocide. News crews broadcasted the 
violence to television screens around the world. All major countries featured news articles and 
news programming during the duration of the genocide. Print media covered the genocide daily 
in the West. This media coverage made the inaction of the international community even more 
appalling. The most powerful countries in the world knew the severity of the situation, and still 
did not take the appropriate actions to help the victims. 
 This analysis focuses on the press from France, Great Britain, and the United States. I 
chose these three countries because they represent major players on the world stage and all three 
hold permanent places on the Security Council of the United Nations. These countries had the 
power to provide relief in Rwanda, but, unfortunately, became hindrances rather than help. 
Another important reason these countries are focused on is their former position as colonial 
powers. All three countries previously held territories and controlled countries, especially in 
Africa, throughout the past two centuries. All three believed in the exportability of their 
 3 
respective cultures and societal structures.
5
 France, the US, and Britain all played an important 
role in the development of Africa both under colonialism and in the years following 
decolonization. 
 This thesis focuses on one major daily paper and one weekly periodical from each of the 
three countries. From France, I chose, Le Monde, a daily left-wing paper published in Paris, and 
L’Express, a Parisian weekly periodical that tends to be right wing. Both French periodicals have 
high circulation within France, and have counterparts in other countries. From the United States, 
I chose The New York Times, a daily paper of record that is the second highest circulated 
newspaper within the country, and Time, a weekly magazine published in New York that is the 
most highly circulated news magazine worldwide. The two British periodicals chosen were, The 
Times, a traditionally moderate daily paper published in London, and The Economist, an English-
language weekly periodical published in London that claims to take an editorial stance on social 
and economic liberalism.   
 While all of these press sources shared the genocide to the world, to think of them as 
monolithic is troublesome. Even to think of a singular country’s press media being cohesive is 
problematic. These sources differ in political affiliation, national influence, and targeted 
objectives. Just like their countries of origin, the reporters of these selected sources, had different 
understandings of Rwanda and vendettas concerning intervention and international 
responsibility. In a study of media, the exclusivity of each media source is important.  
This thesis does not argue against the distinctiveness of the sources, but it does argue that 
among that uniqueness, larger commonalities arose. The reporters did not always agree on 
distinct issues concerning the genocide. Their views on intervention varied throughout the four 
                                                 
5
 Newsome, David D. The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World. Indiana 
University Press, 2001, 30-36. 
 4 
months as well as their stances on the actions of other world powers and how to accurately 
define the situation in Rwanda. But, spanning all three countries, the press perpetuated larger 
themes. The press from all three countries exacerbated the legacies of colonialism and the 
complications of human rights legislation.   
But the reporters went further than that. In the reporting of the Rwandan genocide, the 
reporters highlighted the troublesome relationship between the West and Africa. Hundreds of 
years of Western exploration and colonialism of the African continent created a system of 
Western superiority over Africans. Historically, the Western “image” of Africa is a fictive one. 
The West sees Africans as backward, non-industrialized, and destitute. Essentially, Africans are 
non-European.
6
 This influenced and continues to influences the West’s perceptions and 
interpretations of African conflict and construction of Africans themselves. And, in a Western 
world that rebukes racism, the press coverage during the Rwandan genocide came to perpetuate 
racial stereotypes created by this dichotomy. While the Western media outright acknowledged 
the West’s influence and liability for the genocide, they also made the genocide the fault of the 
Rwandans ostensibly because of underlying racial inferiorities. The reporters separated 
themselves from the colonial ideologies unequivocally, yet perpetuated the racism they claimed 
to reject.  
This inherent racism ingrained within Western reporters complicated the issues of 
intervention and culpability concerning adherence to human rights legislation. Rwandans were 
victims ostensibly because of their innate inferiority yet also connaturally perpetrators of their 
own genocide. For the reporters, this made application of human rights legislation nearly 
impossible to discern. In turn, this led the media to shift the focus away from Rwanda itself and 
                                                 
6
 Nwaubani, Ebere. The United States and Decolonization in West Africa 1950-1960. New York: University of 
Rochester Press, 2001, 50. 
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use the genocide as a scapegoat for denunciation of international world powers and the United 
Nations as a whole. The innocent victims of the genocide got lost in the media shuffle of 
castigation of international foreign policy concerning human rights violations.    
 
Historiography 
 Though the Rwandan genocide is less than twenty years old, the amount of literature on 
the subject is extensive. Scholars began writing on the genocide immediately after it ended. 
There was a need for the international community to come to terms with what had just happened 
but more importantly what they just let happen. In the past two decades, the work published has 
come from many different facets of the scholarly world. Historians, journalists, political 
scientists, and anthropologists, have published works regarding the genocide. Out of this work, 
the historiography of the genocide has a few discernable trends.  
 One major trend that developed in the historiography was how colonial rule created the 
condition for the genocide. Within this trend of the historiography, historians such as Frederick 
Cooper,
7
 Gerard Prunier,
8
 and Mamhood Mamdani
9
 argue that European colonialism created the 
relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Belgian rule of Rwanda institutionalized a 
hierarchical system, creating Tutsi superiority over the Hutu majority. This solidification of 
societal roles led to the inherency of tension between the two groups, resulting in genocide in 
1994. Another major trend in the historiography of the genocide is the history of the memory and 
commemoration of the genocide. Many works, such as those from journalist Philip Gourevitch
10
 
                                                 
7
 Cooper, Frederick. Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
8
 Prunier, Gerard. The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
9
 Mamdani, Mamhood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
10
 Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from 
Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998. 
 6 
and Jennie Burent,
11
 use interviews and testimonies to portray the genocide from a personal 
level. The third major trend focuses on culpability. This trend questions and blames the 
international community for their actions and inactions during the genocide. Historians such as 
Alain Destexhe
12
 and Linda Melvern,
13
 focus on the role of the West and their lack of 
intervention and refusal to acknowledge the situation as genocide. Other historians, such as 
Daniela Kroslak
14
 and Samantha Power,
15
 provide critical studies into specific Western countries 
and their relationships to the genocide.  
 These three trends -the colonial influence, memory and commemoration, and culpability- 
run throughout the historiography of the Rwandan genocide. While media is used by many of the 
authors as a minor part of their individual arguments, there has not been an in-depth analysis of 
the media’s perceptions. This thesis is intended to fill this gap by examining the reporting of the 
Rwandan Genocide by the media in France, Britain, and the United States in order to show how 
the reporters appropriated the language of Rwanda’s colonial past and the provisions of modern 
day human rights legislation to make sense of the genocide to an incredulous public. This thesis 
will argue that the reporters not only embodied Rwanda’s colonial legacy, as they crafted their 
narrative in the context of the “other,” but they also used that legacy to apportion blame and 
assign responsibility for non-intervention in Rwanda. And, in so doing, the reporters became 
embroiled in interpreting confusing human rights legislation to the international community. 
Ultimately, the reporting suggests that instead of taking action against the perpetrators of the 
                                                 
11
 Burnet, Jennie E. Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda. The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2012. 
12
 Destexhe, Alain. Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Translated by Alison Marschner. New York: 
New York University Press, 1995. 
13
 In both, Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide. London: Zed Books, 
2000. And Melvern, Linda. Conspiracy to Murder: Planning the Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso, 2004. 
14
 Kroslak, Daniela. The French Betrayal of Rwanda. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008. 
15
 Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide.” New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
 7 
Rwandan Genocide, Britain, France and the United States, in varying degrees, were more 
preoccupied with blaming each other, and the United Nations. 
But, this thesis will also contribute to the historiography in a larger way. This thesis 
integrates the Rwandan genocide in the larger context of the Western world. This thesis argues 
that the reporting of the genocide exemplified the larger issues concerning racism and the 
legacies of colonialism coming from the West. In turn, this inherent Western racism complicated 
the ability and willingness for Western intervention during the genocide. This thesis adds to the 
historiography by demonstrating how the genocide itself was more than just a product of 
European colonialism; the lack of intervention was also a product of the legacy of Western 
racism toward Africans. While individual Western nations had their own personal relationships 
with Rwanda, the media sources studied proved that monolithic Western views were overarching 
concerning the Rwandan genocide.  
  
Chapter Breakdown 
 This thesis will break down into three different chapters, each analyzing a different aspect 
of the news media from France, Britain, and the United States. The first chapter will focus on 
how colonialism and neocolonialism shaped the media’s outlook on the Rwandan genocide. This 
chapter will show how Rwanda’s colonial legacy created the conditions that engendered the 
genocide, and how the media used these legacies to interpret the events of the genocide. This 
chapter contends that the language of colonialism is not only entrenched in Western culture but 
also conditioned how reporters presented the genocide to the international community. I argue 
that the reporters perpetuated colonial ideologies and language, therefore becoming part of the 
larger colonial narrative and reinforcing the dichotomy between the West and Africa.  
 8 
 The second chapter argues that the reporters, as an ingrained product of the legacies of 
colonialism, used the genocide to allot blame and accredit responsibility to France, Britain, the 
United States, and the United Nations. This chapter examines why the media from certain 
countries felt more of a responsibility to intervene, such as France, but also why others decided 
to remain uninvolved, such as the case of the United States. This chapter also focuses heavily on 
the United Nations as a whole entity. The media from all three countries used the United Nations 
as a source of blame in order to shift individual responsibility onto the larger collective body. I 
argue that the reporters focused on allocating blame and responsibility, overshadowing reporting 
the actual abomination of the genocide, because they did not fully understand the situation in 
Rwanda. 
 The third and final chapter focuses on the medias’ use of language, most importantly, the 
use of the word ‘genocide.’ This chapter opines that the term ‘genocide’ comes along with 
obligation of the international community to intervene based on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. This chapter breaks the media down into two categories, one that was not afraid 
to use the term and the other that shied away from calling the situation in Rwanda by that name. 
This chapter argues that the interaction between these two stances of the media represents the 
larger problems with human rights theory and interpretation of international human rights 
legislation. This final chapter demonstrates the challenges the international community faced 
with the Rwandan genocide through analyzing those complexities on the smaller scale of the 
media.   
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
CHAPTER ONE: THE COLONIAL LEGACY OF GENOCIDE  
 
The genocide in Rwanda had its roots in European colonialism. Colonialism shaped 
relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi and solidified a system of distrust and animosity 
between the two groups. The reporting of the genocide in France, Britain, and the United States 
recognized the effects of colonialism in Rwanda. Reporters used the colonial legacy of the 
country to help make sense of what was going on during the genocide. Reporters also used 
Rwanda’s colonial legacy to place blame and demand that European countries that once ruled 
Rwanda intervene. But, the media also utilized the colonial history of Rwanda to attack and 
criticize former European colonizers and their colonial relationship with Rwanda, as well as their 
neo-colonial relationship that formed after decolonization. 
 The media did not just present a colonial history of Rwanda; it focused heavily on the 
mutual antagonism between the Hutu and the Tutsi that dated back to the period of Belgian 
colonialism. The reporters themselves also became a part of the colonial narrative. The reports 
from Western news media reinforced colonial ideologies and the idea of “otherness” through 
their word choice and descriptions. The reporting takes on the “us versus them” mentality16 in 
which the West dominates Africa and the rest of the Third World. It is reminiscent of what 
Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler describe as the need for the “otherness” of the colonized 
person to be defined and maintained.
17
 The three Western countries analyzed all played a role in 
colonialism and that experience caused a “unique coherence and a special cultural centrality.”18  
                                                 
16
 Said, Culture and Imperialism, xxiii 
17
 Cooper and Stoler, Tensions of Empire, 7. 
18
 Said, Culture and Imperialism, xxii 
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The reporters of the genocide were part of this larger colonial narrative, whether they were 
consciously aware of it or not. The reporters perpetuated the racism that they claimed to reject. 
 Colonial legacies refers to the byproducts of colonialism left over from the colonial 
period. Historian Frederick Cooper explains that the separation between what is considered 
“colonial” and “post-colonial” cannot be thought of as a definitive break. When colonialism 
officially ended, institutions and ideologies remained in place even as the colonizer left. New 
African governments simply inherited colonial enactments and conceptions with no significant 
change.
19
 Here, these “legacies” are in part a continuation of colonial constructs, most 
importantly in this analysis, the continuation of racial separation of the Hutu and the Tutsi 
established under Belgian rule.  
  Within post-colonial Rwanda, the racialization of the Hutu and the Tutsi did not end 
when the Belgians left. Historian Mamhood Mamdani argues that racialization between the two 
groups was much more than an intellectual construct. Under colonial rule, racialization and 
separation became institutionalized.
20
 The Belgians created economic, political, and social 
differences that remained in post-colonial Rwanda. The laws set in place by the Belgians in order 
to solidify Hutu and Tutsi differences survived and continued to spark racial tensions between 
the Hutu and the Tutsi after Rwanda gained independence. It is this legacy, the legacy of 
institutionalized racism left from Belgian colonization, which fuels the argument presented here. 
 Another important issue essential to this argument is the role of neo-colonialism. Kwame 
Nkrumah, former leader of Ghana and its predecessor state the Gold Coast, states that neo-
colonialism represents imperialism in its “final and perhaps most dangerous state.” In essence, 
neo-colonialism suggests that the State is theoretically independent and maintains all of the 
                                                 
19
 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, 4. 
20
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 87. 
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benefits of international sovereignty. But, in reality, the State’s economic system and 
consequently its political policies are actually controlled from the outside.
21
  Neo-colonial 
powers thereby control governments and regimes through monetary support. Therefore these 
powers continue to maintain control over governments and regimes since they require economic 
help in order to keep the country going. In most cases of neo-colonialism, the power in control of 
the State is usually the former colonial ruler of the area. For Rwanda, however, this is not the 
case. 
 Rwanda’s main source of outside economic assistance was not from their former 
colonizer, Belgium, but rather from France. This neo-colonial aid and economic support from 
France caused many issues when genocide broke out in 1994 and put France in a very precarious 
place on the world stage. Historian Daniela Kroslak examines the French role in Rwanda in her 
work and illustrates how the French controlled the Rwandan government by making economic 
aid available only through democratization.
22
 The promise of French aid molded how Rwanda 
grew out of colonization. The neo-colonialism of Rwanda by the French is essential to this 
argument and in understanding the dynamic between the Western world and Rwanda during the 
1994 genocide. 
  
The Rise of European Colonialism and Colonial Legacy in Rwanda 
European thinkers throughout the nineteenth century perpetuated racial ideology through 
their writings and influenced the way that European society saw and understood the colonized. 
Early on, beginning in the eighteenth century, many European thinkers used physical differences 
to justify Western superiority. They argued that phrenology and physiognomy helped determine 
                                                 
21
 Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, ix. 
22
 Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda, 3. 
 12 
self-worth and an individual’s ability to be civilized. According to this model, many 
phrenologists concluded that Africans were innately uncivilizable due to undeveloped brain 
organs and therefore were considered “savages.”23 Explorers and cartographers on the African 
continent perpetuated these views through their stories and writings in order to justify the 
manipulation of Africans to achieve their goals and get what they wanted.
24
 This early form of 
separation and idea of uncivilizability continued into the nineteenth century with the rise of 
colonialism and helped perpetuate European domination of Africa.   
The rise of the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the rise of eugenics, and improvements in technology in parts of Europe and America created a 
gap between industrialized Europe and the colonial world, especially Africa. Historian Michael 
Adas claimed “African cultures were merely manifestations of the vast gap in evolutionary 
development that separated ‘civilized’ Europe from ‘savage’ Africa”25 during the time that 
Europe was industrializing. Adas states that travelers’ accounts of the “rude and primitive” tools 
of Africans reminiscent of the Stone Age in comparison to the new technology surfacing in 
Europe coincided with the beliefs of the time that Africa was indeed “primitive and savage.”26 
Europeans at the time believed that they were millennia ahead of Africans due to reports from 
those Europeans that worked within Africa or had contact with the continent. At that time, this 
vast difference technologically between Europeans and Africans helped perpetuate the idea of 
Africans being savage. European superiority dictated that Africans were their “savage inferiors.” 
                                                 
23
 Staum, Labeling People, 63. 
24
 Staum, Labeling People, 188. 
25
 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 164. 
26
 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 164 
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As technology and scientific discovery spread throughout the European continent, 
colonial administrators began to use this as a basis for comparison.
27
 Scientific achievement 
replaced physical difference when it came to racial theory.
28
 Because Africans were not as 
technologically or scientifically advanced at the time, they were thereby inferior and justifiably 
in a position to be dominated by advanced Europe. Stories and writings from the mid-nineteenth 
century helped spread racial ideology throughout the Western world and cemented European 
racial attitudes.  Even today, these “often corrupted and vulgarized, invariably oversimplified 
and sensationalized … ideas have played a major role from the nineteenth century to the present 
in shaping popular attitudes in Europe and North America toward African and Asian peoples and 
cultures.”29  The reports from France, Britain, and the United States during the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994 reflect these centuries’ old views and demonstrate how Western ideology and 
theory still play a prominent role in Western thought today when it comes to the African 
continent.  
The British and French have a long and well-known history of imperialism throughout 
Africa and the rest of the world that lasted for centuries. But, often times, the United States is not 
referred to as an imperial power among conversations of colonialism. Yet, this thesis uses the 
United States as an avenue to examine Western colonialism concerning Rwanda. With the 
acquisition of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898, 
the United States officially became a colonial power. It was the first time in American history 
that the United States did not seek to make newly obtained territory into states. Acquiring foreign 
                                                 
27
 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 144. 
28
 Staum, Labeling People, 87. 
29
 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 153. 
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colonies, the United States expanded the idea of Manifest Destiny past just the North American 
continent.
30
 
But concerning Africa, the United States played a different type of imperial role. At the 
end of World War II, American diplomacy became focused on maneuvering for power in the 
new international system. The reconfiguration of Africa coincided with the United States’ 
emergence as a superpower; therefore, the United States needed to be a part of the African 
continent. This need to expand interest into Africa also coincided with the formulation of 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States needed to have some 
sort of influence in Africa in order to legitimize international power.
31
  
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States took a minimalistic 
approach to Africa, but still sought to have enough influence in order to remain relevant on the 
world stage. But doing that was not easy in practice. Officially, the United States sought to 
reform rather than preserve minority regimes, yet, American political process did just that, 
complicating the American position within the continent. Racial problems in the United States at 
home muddled the situation even more, with the end of the Jim Crow era and the emanation of 
the civil rights movement.
32
 But the United States still remained influential toward new African 
governments and emerging power structures, even if they did not play as large of a role as 
Britain and France, therefore constituting them as a colonial power for the purpose of this thesis. 
And, like Britain and France, racial prejudices heavily influenced perceptions of Africa by the 
United States that extended into 1994 and the Rwandan genocide.  
                                                 
30
 Manifest Destiny refers to the 19th century American belief that settlers were destined to expand throughout the 
North American continent.   
31
 Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa 1950-1960, 31.  
32
 Newsome, David D. The Imperial Mantle, 159.  
 15 
In order to understand how colonial legacy played into the reporting of the genocide, it is 
necessary to focus on the colonial history of Rwanda and the role it played in the relationship 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. When the first explorers reached Rwanda, they were surprised to 
find that the people of the country appeared homogeneous; they shared the same language,
33
 the 
same religion,
34
 and had no distinct segregations in society even though the population divided 
itself into three groups.  Prior to colonization, in the late nineteenth century, ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ 
appear to have little political significance; they were merely identifiers.
35
 These identities in pre-
colonial Rwanda were fluid. Larger factors played into political identity in pre-colonial Rwanda, 
such as language, kin groups, and marriage. Culture influenced political identity.
36
 But political 
identity in pre-colonial Rwanda did not equate to polarized identities that occurred under 
colonial rule.  
The economic community of pre-colonial Rwanda is an example of how colonialism 
helped define and divide the Hutu and the Tutsi. One notion of the pre-colonial economic 
structure of Rwanda was that the Hutu were agriculturalists and the Tutsi were pastoralists. 
Essentially, Tutsi brought cattle to Rwanda when they settled. But, Mamhood Mamdani refutes 
that notion of separation. According to him, both Hutu and Tutsi carried out agricultural and 
pastoral activities in most regions. And many Hutu owned and raised cattle before the arrival of 
the Tutsi. Mamdani warns that by dividing the pre-colonial Hutu and Tutsi along such strict lines 
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demonstrates “a division enforced through the medium of political power rather than the timeless 
preoccupation of two separate groups of people.”37  
The pre-colonial power structure of Rwanda was quite intricate on the eve of European 
rule. While basically feudal, there was a central administrative system that consisted of four 
levels: province, district, hill, and neighborhood.
38
 The Germans were the first Europeans to 
come to Rwanda and established colonial rule after the Colonial Conference in Berlin in the mid 
1880s.  Arriving in 1892, they came at a very crucial time in Rwanda’s pre-colonial history.39 
The king had just died, and there was no clear heir to the throne. The Rwandans manipulated the 
Germans easily in the fight for the throne that ensued as soon as they got there.
40
 They 
established a policy of indirect rule that supported the Rwandan chiefs, which helped deepen 
their faithfulness to the Germans.
41
 With this policy of indirect rule, the Germans began the 
colonial influence on the Hutu and Tutsi relationship. According to historian Rene Lemarchand, 
“in Rwanda the very success of indirect rule reinforced the absolutism of the monarchy, and 
hence the hegemony of the ruling caste.”42 The Rwandan monarchy, now with German support, 
continued pre-colonial policies that annexed the Hutu principalities and increased chiefly power 
of the Tutsi.
43
 While German rule may have inaugurated the artificial divisions of Hutu and Tutsi 
identification, their rule was short-lived.  
The First World War ended the short German rule in Rwanda; Belgian troops entered the 
country on 6 May 1916.
44
 Under Belgian rule, racialization became an institutional construct.
45
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The Belgians saw the Tutsi as the superior race in Rwanda because of their “European-like” 
features. Prejudice became deeply rooted in administrative policy.
46
 In 1926, the Belgians 
“streamlined” the structure of local government and the power of the chiefs shifted to local 
authorities. The system of joint power, where Hutu and Tutsi shared equal responsibility, was 
abolished. Power was given to a single agent, which happened to almost always be a Tutsi.
47
 By 
the end of Belgian rule, in 1959, forty-three out of forty-five chiefs were Tutsi.
48
  
To have better control, the Belgians established race education. Western style schools 
opened under the Belgians that taught that Tutsi were racially superior. Schools also became 
segregated. The schools admitted both Hutu and Tutsi children but the level of education given 
to each group was drastically different. Tutsi children received standard European education in 
French while the Hutu children received an inferior education. The point of the Hutu education 
was to merely prepare them for manual labor and to indoctrinate them to believe that common 
citizenship was not meant for the Hutu even if they were educated.
49
 The legacy of colonial 
education was still evident during the time of the genocide. Belgian author, Omer Marchal noted 
in 1994, “’the majority of the Tutsi could read, but did not want to vote. The Hutu would all have 
liked to vote, but only a minority could read.’” He blamed this on the fact that Hutu parents 
found school to be useless while Tutsi parents pushed their children to pursue a good 
education.
50
 
While the Belgians fully enforced Tutsi supremacy, how to determine who was Hutu and 
who was Tutsi was still difficult. Because of this, the Belgians decided in 1933 to instate identity 
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cards and a national census.
51
 Ironically, the Belgians themselves had to systematize a definition 
of what was Hutu and what was Tutsi. Physically, the Hutu and the Tutsi varied. But even 
physical aspects changed from region to region and person to person. Finally, the 1933-34 census 
identified the Tutsi as separate from the Hutu according to a ten-cow rule: whoever owned ten or 
more cows was classified as a Tutsi.  Hutu and Tutsi identities became legal after that census, 
and everyone was given an identity card.
52
 The installment of identity cards in the 1930s had a 
direct impact on the genocide six decades later. Identity cards helped the Hutu militias identify 
Tutsi at roadblocks during the genocide.
53
   
Belgian rule in Rwanda established Hutu and Tutsi identity and these identities continued 
until the end of Belgian rule in 1962. The Tutsi now equated power and the Hutu, subject.
54
 
While Rwanda was not devoid of tensions between the two groups before the arrival of 
Europeans, no trace of violence based purely upon ethnic lines appeared between Hutu and Tutsi 
in pre-colonial history.
55
 Violent conflict did not usually pit Hutu against Tutsi, but rather rival 
kingdoms that consisted of both groups of people.
56
 The Belgians destroyed the complex and 
integrated pre-colonial society and in its place placed a regimented and segregated European-
made society that instilled values within Rwandans that would affect their relationships with 
each other throughout the rest of the twentieth century.  
The Second World War brought change to Rwanda as it did for much of Africa. The 
democratization of post-war Europe also affected Rwanda. Europe exported the idea of majority 
rule rather than elite rule to Rwanda and it spread throughout the country. This new rule 
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supported Hutu power since they constituted the majority of the country. The Belgians, with 
pressure from the UN, began to realize that their old ways of ruling, with the Tutsi minority, 
were outdated and Hutu public life began to slowly improve.
57
 Throughout the 1950s, the Hutu 
created political parties and attempted to garner more support from the Belgians and the Church, 
both inside Rwanda and from the international community.
58
 Hutus rallied around the idea that 
Tutsi invaders enslaved the Hutu and stole power from them as they overran the country.
59
 In 
1957, the Hutu created the “Hutu Manifesto” that blamed the Tutsi for monopolizing land, 
power, and education.
60
 The tension continually built throughout the end of the decade between 
the now powerful Hutu and the cast aside Tutsi. 
 Finally the powder keg exploded. The trigger was an alleged assault on a Hutu sub-chief 
by a Tutsi in November 1959. By the end of 1964, thousands were dead, and over 300,000 had 
fled Rwanda and were refugees in neighboring countries.  In 1960, the PARMEHUTU, the 
largest Hutu political party, won their first election, and abolished the monarchy. The Hutu 
Revolution was complete.
61
 During this whole process, the Belgians supported the Tutsi 
minority, yet the Hutu revolution would not have happened so smoothly without Belgian help 
and support. Lemarchand states “The Hutu revolution was a long and painful experience, which 
may no have succeeded without the auxiliary support extended by the Belgian administration to 
the insurgents.”62 The revolution not only left the political identities created under colonialism in 
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place but reinforced them. It was due to the colonial impetus and the solidification of identity 
that the Hutu felt repressed enough to launch a major and violent revolution.
63
 
 Rwanda was officially granted independence on 1 July 1962.
64
 While many Rwandans 
sought independence from colonial rule, many Tutsi feared that, as the minority, they might be 
threatened by the Hutu majority, the victors of the elections. The Hutu, on the other hand, feared 
that the Tutsi were conspiring against the Hutu to try and take back power by ignoring free 
elections.
65
 Directly after the Hutu took control of the country following independence a period 
of calm took place. But the ethnic question became more acute during the early 1970s under 
President Kayibanda. The Kayibanda regime installed quotas that limited jobs and education to 
the Tutsi. Competition for those elusive spots exacerbated racial tension throughout the country 
until Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda in 1973.
66
 
After Kayibanda, Rwandans and the outside world saw Habyarimana as a moderate 
leader.
67
 While Habyarimana brought peace and stability to the country, his iron-fisted rule 
cannot be over looked. Outside of the communist world, Rwanda was probably the most 
controlled state in the world. Habyarimana’s regime was no doubt totalitarian; where the state 
required everyone to carry ID cards in order to strictly regulate travel.
68
 The peace and stability 
did not mean complete ideological liberation of the Tutsi. Tutsi still faced racial discrimination 
and legal exclusion, but, for the most part, everyday life for the Tutsi was quite tolerable.
69
 It was 
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clear, however, that the “ethnic distortions” installed by the Belgians and the Germans were 
“seemingly enshrined in the psyche of Rwanda.”70  
 During Habyarimana’s rule, he tried to open Rwanda to the outside world both politically 
and economically. From 1979 forward, he participated in the Franco-African summits and 
cofounded the Economic Community of the Great Lakes, or the CEPGL.
71
 France became one of 
the closest foreign allies to the Habyarimana regime and Rwanda became part of the 
Francophone world. Slowly, France replaced Belgium as the largest foreign supporter of 
Rwanda. French president Francois Mitterand and Juvenal Habyarimana even considered each 
other personal friends.
72
 The close relationship between the two leaders however, masked the 
neo-colonial, dependent relationship between France and Rwanda. To be sure, France continued 
to use socio-economic, political, and military aid to maintain influence and control, thus 
contributing to the outbreak of the violence that alimented in the genocide.  
 The 1990 civil war that ended in the genocide of 1994, discussed in the introduction, built 
itself upon this long, intricate history of Rwanda. Years of European racial indoctrination and 
involvement resulted in the death of nearly a million innocent Tutsi and moderate Hutu within a 
period of only four months. The news media from the United States, Great Britain, and France 
all use this colonial legacy in their reports of the genocide.  
 
The Colonial Legacy and Western Perceptions of Africa 
The reporters in France, Britain, and the United States all used the colonial and neo-
colonial legacies of Rwanda and Africa during the time of the genocide in order to help the 
public understand why the civil war and genocide were taking place. The media focused on 
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Belgium and France mostly, due to their colonial and neo-colonial relationships with Rwanda. 
The news media mainly used the Belgian colonial legacy to explain the hatred between the Hutu 
and the Tutsi. The real criticism of the Belgians by the media came only after the Belgians 
withdrew from Rwanda shortly after the genocide started. The news media always justified their 
withdrawal, though they were one of the most likely candidates to give aid within their former 
colony, because of their loss of men in the first week of the genocide.
73
  
The Belgian colonial influence is mentioned in the media from all three countries as the 
reason for the violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Rwanda was the “case study in what 
happens to a former colony when suppressed tribal rivalries are released into a power vacuum.”74 
The New York Times mentions the Belgian colonial influence as early as 9 April,
75
 and an article 
from 11 July goes more in depth by describing the Belgians classification system and their 
implementation of identity cards.
76
 It is stressed that these identity cards put in place under 
colonial rule were still in use during the time of the genocide and were helping many Hutu 
militia identify, and thus kill, Tutsi.
77
 For reporters of Time, “the legacy of Belgian rule all but 
guaranteed the violence that has erupted.”78 The Economist reports also acknowledged that 
“Ethnic and political hostility are inseparably entwined in Rwanda’s history”79 due to Belgian 
influence. The Belgian colonial influence perpetuated the violence that took place in 1994 
according to the news media. 
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The press used the institutional racialization of Rwanda by the Belgians to demonstrate 
the legacy of Belgian colonialism. On 18 June, The Times told readers that the Hutu were able to 
get ordinary citizens to kill their neighbors because “racial ideology is almost certainly what 
transformed the crisis into full-scale genocide.”80 The French media also understood that “racial 
hatred was developed, distilled by those who wanted power or to conquer,”81 and established that 
the country’s colonial history and racialization by Europeans caused it to be a “powder-keg.”82 In 
essence, the news media recognized that “the otherness of colonized persons was neither inherent 
nor stable; his or her difference had to be defined and maintained.”83 The history of Belgian 
colonial rule in Rwanda is used as the primary context of the problem between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi and gave understanding to why the killing is going on.  
The news media used racial reasoning in an attempt to understand how Europe viewed its 
former colonial territory. Former colonial powers were not coming to the aid of Rwanda and this 
“intensifies suspicion that the white West’s refusal to come to the aid of black Africa is racist”84 
according to American journalist Marguerite Michaels. A 7 May article from The Economist uses 
race to understand why there was no intervention happening by former colonial powers. “The 
world did not want to know. Rwanda was too difficult, too remote, too black.”85 The American 
media criticized the British racial reasoning for not getting involved. “Rwandans are thousands 
of miles away. Nobody you know has ever been on holiday to Rwanda. And Rwandans don’t 
look like us.”86 The French media took the racial aspect to a visual level as well. Many cartoons 
appearing in Le Monde featured dark black people in traditional African garb, barefoot with 
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lavish beaded jewelry and babies on their hips while the European in the cartoon was almost 
always in uniform. The over exaggeration of race in cartoons shows that the racial profiling from 
colonialism still remains in the psyche of the Western reporters. 
The European colonial legacy in Africa is multi-faceted within the media. The first way 
the media uses European colonialism is to criticize Europe for the lack of intervention and their 
initial withdrawal when they had played such a large role in the formation of present day Africa. 
Many leaders in the peacekeeping mission in place in Rwanda when the genocide broke out were 
surprised that the “ex-colonial white countries” would pull out their troops in the time of most 
need.
87
 The news media followed suit. A 25 May article from The New York Times shows that 
“former colonial powers are no longer willing to intervene quickly in African lands.”88 Time 
continues the criticism of former colonial powers “that used to intervene regularly have devolved 
responsibility.”89 Often times the media explained that it was easier and more convenient for the 
West to “blame the ‘old demons of Rwanda’”90 than take responsibility for their creation. 
The news media also justified this lack of intervention with the notion that Africa did not 
and could not adapt to the Western model of democracy. And because of this, “Africa, in 
general, and the unfortunate nation of Rwanda, has beggared Western experience and 
imagination.”91 Frederick Cooper explains this inability to democratize as a result of the 
distortions that came out of decolonization. African nations became “gatekeeper states”92 which 
had to balance internal problems with corruption and forming new governments with “the 
interface of national and world economies.”93 “It [the violence in Rwanda] is another signal to 
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the West that we cannot push democracy faster than it can be assimilated.”94 The inability of 
most African states, including Rwanda, to adapt to Western democracy in the years following 
decolonization became a platform that the media used to understand the relationship between the 
West and Rwanda.  
Also, the media used the history of democratization in Rwanda to contextualize what led 
to violence.  “In the frenzy of democratization in Africa that gripped the continent, it included a 
revision of the Constitution, the recognition of fourteen political parties, liberalization of the 
press, the creation of the new national army and the formation of a broad-based government (that 
is to say including the Tutsi minority).”95 And because of this difference between African nations 
and the West, these problems with Rwanda’s inability to efficiently employ the Western model, 
Rwanda is portrayed as “small, poor, and globally insignificant”96 and shown as a country that 
has “never been strategically significant in world politics.”97 The news media used the failure of 
Rwandan democratization and assimilation to Western politics, as is so with much of the rest of 
Africa, after decolonization to demonstrate why former colonial powers did not willingly jump to 
the aid of Rwanda when the violence broke out.   
A reason for this came from the idea that Rwanda is a product of the fate of Africa
98
 and 
“maybe we consider ethnic massacres as part of the order of things.”99 Many times the reporters 
over exaggerate the reality of the genocide with the idea that Africa is doomed to violence. 
Frederick Cooper offers the idea that Africa only has “two possible fates” the first being 
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“dissolving into ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ violence.”100 An article in L’Express questions the lack on 
concern for Rwanda early on due to the pretext that “monstrous Africa, after all, is condemned 
and doomed to indifference.”101 Africa is seen as a “rudderless continent, staved of democracy 
and stifled by war and misrule.”102 In a 15 June article, The New York Times describes Rwanda 
as “a semantic sponge to crimes against humanity.”103 An article in The Times describes the 
situation in Rwanda as “a case of that classic African equilibrium: internal chaos balanced by 
external philanthropy.”104 Because Rwanda is doomed to violence, a legacy left over from 
decolonization, the media seemed to suggest that the West devolved responsibility of 
intervention because Rwanda is simply a product of its own fate.  
The Western understanding of Rwanda and its place in world politics can also be seen in 
how the media framed the genocide within the context of other events going on in the world. 
Often times, the Rwandan genocide took a backseat to the situation in Bosnia. The day after 
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, the President of Tanzania described Rwanda as 
“a Bosnia on our doorstep.”105 Bosnia’s location in Europe and echoes of the Holocaust caused 
the situation to take front-page news.
106
 Tiny Rwanda would not “blow Central Africa apart- as 
the Balkans might Eastern Europe.”107 This media focus on Bosnia demonstrates the racial aspect 
of the press coverage. Bosnia is European, while Rwanda is African. The focus on Bosnia further 
racialized the media because the reporters focused more on Europeans than Africans.  
Also during the genocide, the headlines revolved around another African nation. On 27 
April 1994, South Africa elected Nelson Mandela president after spending twenty-seven years in 
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prison under the system of apartheid. It was the first time in the history of the country that the 
South African government permitted black South Africans to vote.
108
 The media praised South 
Africa, a former British colony, and used these positive events to contrast with the genocide in 
Rwanda. Rwanda and South Africa became juxtaposed in Western media.  
 
The Legacy of the French Relationship and Neo-colonialism 
After 1962, France maintained an active role on the African continent, as did a majority 
of the former colonial powers. The fall of colonialism gave way to the rise of neo-colonialism in 
which former colonial powers tried to transfer the reins of government to “neocolonial regimes” 
in order to maintain power and control in Africa.
109
 France was quick to jump in and become a 
neo-colonial power. They especially favored Francophone Africa to counter the rise of the 
Anglo-American influence. Rwanda was among these African countries. France sought to 
achieve its goal for continued influence in Rwanda, and the rest of Africa, through cultural, 
economic, and military strategy. France declared verbally and in practice that it was willing to 
intervene both militarily and diplomatically throughout African nations to protect its neo-
colonial interests.
110
 And Rwanda was no exception.  
A large source of criticism of the genocide by the media concerned France and its 
relationship with Rwanda. Throughout the Fifth Republic, France continued an “activist Africa 
policy” in which France sought to forge strategic, economic, and political ties between both 
former colonies and other African countries that were outside the French influence during 
colonialism.
111
 According to Gerald Prunier, France had always “seen itself as a large hen 
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followed by a docile brood of little black chicks.”112 In the years leading up to the genocide, 
France was the only Western country to maintain significant military presence in Rwanda, a far 
greater presence than that of the United States or the United Kingdom.
113
  This military presence 
helped train and fund African troops and supply weapons and arms to African militias. France 
poured millions of Francs into the Rwandan military. Between 1975 and 1990, the French spent 
FF 5 million on the Rwandan military, and when the war with the RPF broke out in 1990, the 
French spent another FF 5 million between 1990 and 1993 alone.
114
 In the case of Rwanda, this 
French training and access to arms became useful for the Hutu during the genocide.  
The close relationship with the Habyarimana regime sheds light on why the French put so 
much money and effort into the Rwandan military, especially after the RPF invasion in 1990. 
Part of France’s neo-colonial relationship with Rwanda centered on forming diplomatic 
relationships and friendships with African leaders in order to maintain stability and control.
115
 
This included Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana. Habyarimana knew that having a close 
relationship with France secured his power and position. The French helped the regime maintain 
its power through political, economic, and financial support. Following the RPF invasion, France 
tripled its financial support to the country in order to maintain Habyarimana’s power and 
stabilize the regime.
116
 
The French relationship with the Habyarimana regime was immediately criticized at the 
beginning of the genocide by the media. France “in propping up the Rwandan regime for so 
long…bears part of the blame for the current bloodbath.”117 On 9 April, just three days after 
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Habyarimana’s plane crashed, a contingent of French soldiers deployed to Kigali in order to 
evacuate French ambassadors but also high-ranking Rwandan officials, all of which were Hutu, 
including the Habyarimana family. They were flown to Paris and given a safe haven.
118
 This 
evacuation garnered extreme criticism from the international community and the media, 
including the media from France. “However – and this is what makes this complaint particularly 
embarrassing – some accomplices of crimes, were evacuated by the French army and were on 
our territory a few weeks ago.” 119  The media also criticized this action by relating it to how the 
French see themselves in the grand scheme of international human rights.  “The ‘homeland of 
human rights,’ has more fervor to smuggle the first plane of relatives of Habyariamana than to 
save the personnel – Tutsi- from the embassy in Kigali… Under an unusual ‘republican 
tradition’, France hosts, at a great expense, the entourage of the deceased.”120  
Throughout the genocide, France appeared to stand with the other Western countries 
when it came to getting involved. They did not get directly involved until mid-June under 
Operation Turquoise. But, when France’s reputation was in danger, they changed their 
outlook.
121
 Much of the criticism from the media concerning France’s past relationship with 
Rwanda came with the beginning of Operation Turquoise. “Operation Turquoise has saved some 
lives, but it is also shielding some of the most notorious ringleaders of the massacres.”122 During 
Operation Turquoise, France constantly pledged its neutrality to the situation despite their 
previous relationship with the Hutu regime. “Paris says its objective is to halt genocide, not to 
take sides in tribal violence.”123 Yet, the media did not let anyone forget that France originally 
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supported the murderers. “It was France that rushed in combat troops [in 1990] and artillery to 
help the government.”124 Indeed, the media continually emphasized, “France, which once 
supported the Government, insists that it had no military or political objectives.”125 An article in 
The Times quoted the French Defense Minister François Leotard, replying to scrutiny that 
Operation Turquoise was “to prevent the murder of civilians. This has nothing to do with 
imperialism.”126 But the media, from all three countries continually question the French role in 
Rwanda under the precedence that they can “hardly claim to be neutral”127 due to their long 
relationship with the Hutu regime. 
One consequence of France’s prior relationship with Rwanda that the media focused on is 
how the Hutu and the Tutsi understood that relationship themselves. As Operation Turquoise 
began, many Rwandans held conflicting views of the role that the French sought to play once in 
the country. As the French entered the country, they found that “Rwandans have their own ideas 
on what the paratroopers should do.”128 Yet, throughout the country, the French tricolor flag flew 
and walls and storefronts read “Vive la France.”129 There was a difference in Tutsi perception of 
the French according to the news media between the RPF and Tutsi civilians. The RPF did not 
trust the French due to their history of Hutu support. “The Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF), masters of two-thirds of the country vehemently reject any intrusion of France, 
guilty in their eyes to have armed and trained the Hutu murderers.”130 They see the French as an 
object of suspicion. The media continually reiterated that Paul Kagame, head of the RPF, saw 
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French intervention as an attack on the RPF and its mission
131
 and as “a colonial exercise.”132 
Also, the RPF’s opinion of the French fell into a larger theme of decolonization. Edward Said 
shows how post-imperialism formed a cultural discourse of suspicion among formerly colonized 
people.
133
 It is a distrust of the West overall, on top of France’s former relationship with 
Rwanda, that drove the RPF and other Rwandans to fear French, and European, intervention and 
aid. 
But, in contrast with the RPF, many Tutsi saw the French as their saviors and protectors. 
“The French paratroopers seemed like saviors to the 3000 Tutsi men, women and children.”134 
An article in L’Express depicts Tutsi children singing upon French arrival, “‘France brings us 
peace. Machetes and stakes can no longer kill.’”135 This contrast between the leaders of the RPF 
and the ordinary Tutsi citizen demonstrates a contrast in ideological perception between political 
and everyday life within Rwanda. Those in charge understood the significance of the French 
relationship with the Hutu and how that affected the relationship between the two groups. 
Meanwhile, the average Tutsi citizen did not understand this significance. A New York Times 
article acknowledges this identity problem carried over from colonization in a 27 June article. 
“Many villagers interviewed at the refugee camp after the massacre said they had never known 
who was a Tutsi and who was a Hutu.”136 This ideological difference demonstrates how colonial 
legacy still played a role in Rwanda years after decolonization. 
On the other hand, the media showed how the Hutu, at least in the beginning, saw the 
French as saviors to their cause. They believed that they were there to aid the Hutu militias and 
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fight against the RPF, as they had previously four years ago. As the French arrived in Rwanda in 
late June, under Operation Turquoise, “delighted Hutu” welcomed the French by “wearing 
tricolor headbands…flying the French flag.”137 The media shows how the Hutu believed that the 
French were there in order to help them fight the RPF like that had done before.  
“France sees itself as a world power. And its main field of action is Africa, where it has 
an important role to play because of long standing tradition – especially in French speaking 
Africa.”138 Much of French policy in Africa during this time came from a desire to maintain 
French status in international politics, but also as part of the Fashoda syndrome.
139
 France 
became a “friend to a continent that is home to four times as many French-speakers as 
France.”140 France’s “obsession with preserving the reach of the French language”141 became the 
driving force in French African policy. The Fashoda syndrome played a role throughout France’s 
relationship with Rwanda. The invasion of the rebels from Uganda, an Anglophone nation, in 
1990, at the beginning of the civil war, represented Anglo-Saxon influence spreading to a 
Francophone nation. The French saw the invasion as an attack on their influence within 
Africa.
142
 During this time, “it was France that rushed in combat troops, mortars, and artillery to 
help the Government.”143 Four years later, during the genocide, many reporters warn against 
“underestimating the Fashoda syndrome”144 as to why the French finally intervened in Rwanda. 
                                                 
137
 “French Paratroopers,” The New York Times, June 26, 1994. 
138
 “France’s Rwanda Connection,” The New York Times, July 3, 1994. 
139
 Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda, 62. The Fashoda syndrome refers to the incident at Fashoda in the 
Anglo-French rivalry where British troops forced the French to withdraw from a fort in Sudan in 1898. This event 
helped fuel the rivalry, and strengthened French need to maintain French influence in Africa. Today, the Anglo-
French rivalry does not just focus on the United Kingdom, but also includes the French desire to stop 
Americanization and United States influence on the African continent. 
140
 “Who Will Save Rwanda?” The Economist, June 25, 1994.  
141
 “Rwanda Francais,” The Times, June 23, 1994.  
142
 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 106. 
143
 Frank Smyth, “French Guns, Rwandan Blood,” The New York Times, April 14, 1994. 
144
 Vincent Hugeux, “Rwanda: la mort crie victorie.” L’Express, June 9, 1994. 
 33 
The media focused on how the Fashoda syndrome played a large role in how France 
dedicated itself to Rwanda, both before the genocide and during Operation Turquoise. The 
British media was very vocal about the effect that Fashoda played on the French. An article in 
The Economist described the importance of French cooperation with the RPF in the history of 
French relations with the country since Rwanda was a “country that they have long feared would 
fall into the sphere of its English-speaking neighbors.”145 The colonial history of Britain and 
France still affected their relationship during the genocide and it is evident through media 
portrayal of how their long history dictates how one country sees the other. 
The media from all three countries used the colonial and neo-colonial legacies, 
concerning the Belgians and the French, in many different ways in order to paint a picture of 
what was happening in Rwanda during the four months of genocide. But colonial legacy played 
another role within the media as well. The reporters and the newspapers also become part of the 
colonial narrative in the discussion of Rwanda and the West.  
 
The Colonial Legacy on the West 
Colonialism and its legacy played a large role in the media by helping the reporters make 
sense of the genocide, whether over exaggerated or not, for the common public. But, the 
reporters use colonial legacy in another way in their reporting. The reporters became a part of the 
colonial narrative with their word choice and descriptions of the genocide. Over time, the 
imperial experience gained by Britain, France, and America shaped ideas about African culture 
within Western discourse.
146
 And this is evident in the reporting of the genocide. The Western 
reporters demonstrated legacies of colonialism and European racial ideology by asserting 
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Western dominance over black Africa, in this case Rwanda, in their articles by their word choice 
and subtle descriptions of the small African nation.  
To be sure, the colonial powers put in place a racial discourse of superior versus inferior 
in order to maintain control.
147
 Race became a major vehicle to establish European dominance 
over black Africa. Racism was necessary in establishing principles of innate and inherent 
superiority.
148
 And racial discourse is apparent within the reporting of the genocide by Western 
reporters, even so many years after decolonization and African independence.  
In many instances, the media referred to Rwandans as “savages.” A 20 May Le Monde 
report refers to a Rwandan as a “savage,”149 while a 9 April The Times article says that many 
English think that Rwandans are “savages.”150 The American news media also falls prey to the 
use of racial discourse. A 14 July New York Times article states “Rwanda’s torment underscores 
the difficulty of stopping savage conflict.”151 By making the Rwandan into a savage, the Western 
media holds true to the discourse of colonialism and European domination over Africa. By using 
this word, the reporters become intertwined with this discourse and perpetuate Western notions 
of superiority over Africa.  
Two other colonial discourses can be seen throughout the reporting of the genocide. The 
first is the sexual discourse of colonialism. Some scholars have begun the investigation into how 
colonialism affects sexuality and vice versa. This area of scholarship came in the wake of the 
cultural turn in historiography. The media’s use of sexualized language perpetuated the notion of 
Western dominance. A 28 June The Times article states that “France’s Operation Turquoise 
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yesterday, penetrated deep into Central Rwanda.”152 France’s penetration into the country exerts 
Western dominance over the African nation. The Times continues the sexual discourse in an 
article a few days later. In describing the safe zones that the French set up under Operation 
Turquoise, there was “no penetration by armed units.”153 The use of the word “penetration,” 
especially by the British news media, is significant to their colonial legacy. British reporters 
show how former colonial powers have the ability to “penetrate” or regulate “penetration” within 
an African nation even now that that nation is sovereign.  
The discourse of paternalism is also prevalent throughout the media. A 9 April article in 
The Times talks about how peacekeepers “cannot cure Rwanda’s blood frenzy.”154 By using the 
word “cure,” the reporter shows that there is something wrong with Rwanda, something that 
needs to be cured, essentially by the West. Later, The Times featured an article that describes 
how the Hutu captives are being “reeducated.”155 Here, there is a need, for the West, to educate 
Rwandans. This need for reeducation demonstrates again, how the Western world dominates 
Africa and maintains superiority.  
The reporters also demonstrate how colonial legacy plays a role on them by 
misrepresenting the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Because they are Africans, they 
have always been doomed to violence and tensions. The best way this is exemplified is the 
reporters’ portrayal of the genocide as a product of long-term conflict between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi. Mahmood Mamdani, among other historians, argues that under colonialism, Hutu and 
Tutsi emerged as state-enforced political identities. Before the arrival of Europeans, no strong 
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examples of violence between the two groups existed.
156
 The media describe the problems 
between the Hutu and Tutsi as rooted in “centuries old domination.”157 They were “rooted in 
centuries old feuds between Rwanda’s majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups.”158 This 
over exaggeration of the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi shows how the reporters are 
a product of the larger discourse of African turmoil.  
 
Conclusion 
 The use of Rwanda’s colonial history helped the media make sense of the genocide and 
violence that was taking place in Rwanda in 1994. The discussions of the Belgian colonial legacy 
and the French neo-colonial legacy demonstrate how the West is integrated into the violence. 
The news media also put the situation in Rwanda into the context of the larger discourses of 
colonial and neocolonial Africa, mainly the fate of Africa and the problems with democracy on 
the continent. 
But, the news media and the reporters themselves also fall prey to colonial legacies. The 
reporters from all three countries are a part of the larger discourse of colonialism, whether they 
meant to be or not. They perpetuated the legacies of Western dominance over African nations by 
their word choices and verbal images of Rwandans and the situation in Rwanda. The Western 
colonial legacy is ingrained within them and the reporters continue the ideas of Western 
superiority through their reporting on the Rwandan genocide. The news reports from the time of 
the genocide use colonialism in order to portray the genocide to the public, but they also use 
those colonial legacies in order to make sense of the genocide within the Western world. 
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Ultimately, the reporters of the genocide preserved the racism and dominance that they tended to 
denounce.  
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CHAPTER TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
All three countries, France, Britain, and the United States, played a large role in 
colonialism and still continue to influence the development of formerly colonized countries. But 
these three countries also played a large role in another important development in the twentieth 
century. In the wake of the Nazi Holocaust, the cry of “Never Again”159 spread throughout the 
world. With the fall of Hitler’s Nazi regime in 1945 and the liberation of Occupied territory, 
Allied forces unveiled to the world the horrors of what had taken place in Nazi ruled Europe 
during World War II. In the end, the Nazis exterminated six million Jews and five million Poles, 
Communists, Roma, and other “undesirables” within a matter of years.160 The world was in 
shock. Something needed to be done to make sure that something of this magnitude would never 
happen again. And from that, the modern human rights movement was born.  
 Defining what constitutes a human right is not easy, nor consistent. Essentially, human 
rights are rights held by individuals simply because they are part of the human species. 
Everyone, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, or economic background, share them 
equally.
161
 But there has always been controversy with such a simple definition. While, some say 
that human rights are universal, others argue that rights are a Western invention, created in order 
to export a culture’s notions and impose them upon other cultures.162  The world has defined and 
redefined human rights within contexts of political need, moral imperative, and local context 
throughout their long history.
163
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Such a complex understanding of human rights makes understanding the violations of 
human rights complicated and ambiguous as well. Lynn Hunt states that: “the process had and 
has an undeniable circularity to it: you know the meaning of human rights because you feel 
distressed when they are violated.”164 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states 
multiple offenses on human rights. The document defines the problems with slavery, torture, and 
arbitrary arrest or exile against the institution of human rights among thirty other articles worth 
of potential violations. The problem comes with how to deal with those violations. It is easy to 
look at a situation and say that human rights, the right to liberty and freedom, was violated, but 
there is a problem of how to adequately deal with those people or groups.  
The debate between cultural relativism and universality complicates human rights 
heavily. Princeton University defines cultural relativism as the principle that an individual’s 
beliefs and activities should be understood by others in terms of that individual's own culture.
165
 
This contrasts with the Universalist approach to human rights that promotes human rights as a 
universal entitlement. The problem with cultural relativism in human rights legislation and 
implementation is that many nations and leaders have abused the concept. Cultural relativism is a 
“recurrent product of a historical failure to promote universal rights discourse in practice, rather 
than a legitimate alternative to the comprehensive vision offered by a universal stand on 
justice.”166  
Cultural relativism became a way for Third World dictators and tyrannical governments 
to justify murder, torture, and abuse within their sovereign nations.
167
 This complicates how the 
United Nations and the international community decide and justify getting involved in certain 
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circumstances, especially concerning the Third World.  And concerning the Rwandan genocide, 
cultural relativism played a large role due to how the West understood the situation in Rwanda 
and their ability to interpret the situation correctly.  
Cultural relativism made the genocide in Rwanda difficult for the West to understand and 
interpret. But racial legacies of colonialism and the inert perpetuation of Western dominance 
over Africa complicated matters even more. While the reporters sought to understand how 
human rights legislation and implementation should be applied to Rwanda, often times, they also 
turned made the genocide into the fault of the Rwandans themselves. The reporters maintained 
Western ideals that delineated the genocide as a product of the natural order of things for African 
nations. This perceived ineptness of Africa to dissolve into unrest influenced the reporters as 
they sought to involve the genocide into international human rights policy.    
This chapter will analyze how human rights responsibility was a complex phenomenon 
during the genocide. Much like colonial legacies, human rights played a role in how the media 
understood and interpreted who needed to intervene in Rwanda. But, also like the legacies from 
colonialism, human rights legislation and protection during the Rwandan genocide was not clear-
cut and was highly contested between the media of the different countries. France, Britain, and 
the United States role as protectors of human rights became tangled with their past experiences 
and self-appropriated subjectivities. 
 
The Birth of the Modern Human Rights Movement 
The Western world was not new to the principles of human rights. In fact, some 
historians claim that examples of human rights date back to ancient times, articulated by poets, 
 41 
philosophers, and politicians.
168
 Human rights first became prominent during the Enlightenment. 
Philosophers and thinkers began to question both the Church and ancient Greek and Roman 
authorities; world order began to be understood differently, thanks to scientific progress and the 
wars of the Reformation. New discoveries opened the world to a better understanding of human 
consciousness and developed secular and universal laws, rather than religious teachings and 
supernatural explanations of human phenomenon.
169
  
A pioneer of human rights during the Enlightenment was English philosopher John 
Locke. He began the argument that an individual had the right to choose religion; that right did 
not belong to the State. His call for a greater separation between Church and State opened a new 
chapter in the struggle for religious freedom and freedom of opinion.
170
 Locke also argued, “the 
autonomous male entering into a social compact with other such individuals was the only 
possible foundation of legitimate authority.”171 For Locke, humans had natural rights and those 
revolved around “’reciprocal’ liberty, ‘not a state of license.’”172 Locke allowed that people 
would consent to monarchial government but it would be irrational to submit to absolute 
arbitrary power. It would be impossible to consent to it because absolute arbitrary power could 
not convey to another what they do not rightfully possess.
173
  
Two countries took those teachings from revolutionaries like Locke and used them to 
revolutionize their governments and societies. In the eighteenth century, France and the United 
States became sovereign states. In mid-June 1776, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
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with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of 
Happiness.” Jefferson, with this one sentence, turned the United States Declaration of 
Independence into a long-lasting proclamation of human rights.
174
 Thirteen years later, the 
French, during their own revolution, adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
that stated, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”175 While these two 
documents became the foundation for human rights understanding throughout the next two 
centuries, they faced the same contradictions encountered by modern day human rights 
legislation. When the language of human rights emerged during this time, that language lacked a 
clear definition of rights.
176
 
Ambiguity of human rights continued into post World War II legislation as well. On 10 
December 1948, a majority of states adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a 
night session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Declaration was the culmination of 
three years worth of negotiation and debate about how to implement a system to protect the 
rights of people around the world. The UN proclaimed that the Declaration was a “common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” Only the communist bloc, South Africa, 
and Saudi Arabia withheld their endorsement.
177
 This Declaration was a drastic change from the 
human rights politics of the eighteenth century; now the nation-state held responsibility for 
protecting the rights of their citizens.
178
 
The problem with this new human rights legislation, much like the legislation from the 
eighteenth century, was paradoxes. Even for the creators of the legislation, a solid definition of 
human rights was hard to pinpoint. “The human rights paradigm is resilient; one of its 
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remarkable characteristics is the capacity to mean different things to different people while 
retaining overall ideological coherence.”179 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
solidified the protection of human rights, a huge difference remained between policy and 
practice. While clean and organized, the Declaration contains many ambiguities in wording, 
especially concerning concepts such as freedom and self-determination. It also lacks any 
provision on how to enforce rights.
180
 “Human rights are easier to endorse than enforce.”181 
Since 1945, political need and relevant context defined and redefined human rights.
182
  
The problems with human rights legislation and implementation did not just stop with 
that document. A changing world order and the relationship between the Western world and the 
former African and Asian colonies shaped how the international community viewed their place 
in the human rights entity. It also created an ideological tension, which is still ever present, 
between the Western world and the newly sovereign nations. “The politics of anticolonialism 
both advanced and obstructed the progress of international human rights.”183 One of the biggest 
components of decolonization was the move toward self-determination by colonized peoples.
184
 
Newly independent countries attempted to find their place in the world order and to legitimize 
their recently found sovereignty. When the UN drafted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Africa and other colonized countries had no representation or input since, at that point, 
they were only colonies.
185
 African and Asian countries joined forces with each other to solidify 
their independence movements. The first major stride toward this non-aligned movement was the 
Bandung Conference that took place in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, during the beginning of the 
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Cold War. Six independent African nations joined with almost all of Asia to create a human 
rights agenda for decolonized states.
186
  
This coming together of decolonized states, at first, alarmed the West. The West was 
afraid of the creation of an anti-Western bloc and this new group might align with communism 
under the platforms of racial solidarity and anticolonialism.
187
 But as long as the West was able 
to maintain control in the UN, they were open to whatever the newly independent countries 
wanted.
188
 The West also played a paradoxical role when it came to human rights protection and 
decolonization. During this time, Western countries, mainly France and Great Britain, promoted 
human rights while simultaneously putting down uprisings for independence in their colonies.
189
  
Sovereignty and the right to self-determination mainly concerned former colonized states 
in the beginning. But that shifted over time. Slowly, the newly formed nations shifted toward 
authoritarian control. The Proclamation of Tehran, given during the Tehran Conference in 1968, 
set forth a hierarchy of rights that favored radical delegations and leaders. The state’s rights 
gained primacy over the rights of the individual.
190
 This example not only shows how rights are 
fluid, but also demonstrates the complexities of the relationship between the West and the Third 
World. Essentially, at Tehran, the Third World “outgunned” the states of the West and did not 
outwardly oppose this new application of rights.
191
 While cultural relativism remained ever 
present, Tehran and the new human rights order that came out of it strengthened the theory. The 
paradigm of human rights shifted from universalism to cultural relativism at least until the end of 
the Cold War.  
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Ironically, the West championed cultural relativism in the beginning. In the early 1950s, 
in order to maintain control over their colonies, many Western powers argued for an exemption 
clause for their overseas territories, which they argued on the basis of cultural difference.
192
 Once 
states gained their independence, the West went back to support for universality. And by the 
1970s, Third World countries dismissed civil and political rights as Western; universality was 
deemed imperialist.
193
 And by the 1990s, many African and Asian countries codified cultural 
relativism as their official ideology.
194
  
Cultural relativism created a huge gap between the Western world that promoted 
universality and those authoritarian countries in the Third World that championed relativism. 
Current human rights debates show that African countries held different priorities when it came 
to what needed to be protected. African notions of human rights tended to be more concerned 
with the collective rather than the individual. Also, African notions of human rights formed a 
hierarchy, where civil and political rights are not realized as long as social and economic rights 
remain rudimentary.
195
 Cultural relativism were human rights and the difference in Western and 
Third World thinking continues to cause problems. “The concept that relativists champion in 
terms of respect for the Third World cultures had ended up providing a powerful excuse for those 
who murder, torture, and abuse Third World people.”196 Problems between the Western World 
and the Third World on human rights after decolonization show the complexity of protecting 
ideas. Human rights are hard to protect when there is no common agreement on what rights need 
to be protected. 
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The end of the Cold War drastically changed human rights policy because  “human rights 
cannot be separated from political, economic, or cultural globalization.”197 The new surge in 
information technology made human rights promotion easier and faster. Many Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) now offered websites that allow people to help fight the 
cause in a few keystrokes. The role of the press became important in the human rights movement 
because of the ability to move information quickly.
198
 But technology also widened the gap 
between rich and poor countries that further strained the relationship between the West and the 
Third World.
199
 This gap caused the West to seem “more omnipresent” which led to a more 
forceful resistance by nationalists and those that favor cultural relativism.
200
  
Human rights legislation has not followed an easy course since its implementation in 
1946. Globalization brought changes and criticism to the UN and the rest of the Western World. 
The 1990s saw the first global effort to enforce human rights when the UN set up courts to deal 
with war criminals from Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These courts led to the creation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.
201
 But, the 1990s also became a “decade of 
international apology politics.”202 Countries around the world began to offer official apologies 
for past atrocities committed in order to reaffirm the legitimacy of their efforts to protect human 
rights. But even with the outpouring of apologetic sympathy towards past wrongdoings, only five 
years after the Berlin Wall fell, the international community, that had recently reaffirmed 
protection of human rights, watched the Rwandan genocide happen. 
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Responsibility 
 Since 1946, the international community has held a moral responsibility, bound by a 
signed document, to protect against human rights violations. But, in 1994, the outside world 
failed Rwanda when it came to upholding that responsibility. The media recognized this failure 
almost immediately after the genocide broke out. The media criticized the international 
community on their lack of intervention and lack of desire to protect human life. And when one 
country finally did directly intervene in Rwanda, the media celebrated that intervention. The 
media held the international community responsible for protecting human life and adhering to 
their moral responsibility, even though upholding that responsibility is complex.  
 
International Responsibility 
“But for European groups, which will protect the Tutsi minority?”203 That question 
appeared 21 April 1994 in L’Express, almost three weeks after the genocide began. The 
international community played an important role in the genocide in Rwanda. It is a role known 
for inaction rather than action. Rwanda gained sympathy from the international community but 
also a “firm pledge to stay away.”204 Historians of the genocide repeatedly blame the 
international community for taking a backseat to the genocide and ignoring the need for 
intervention. The media from France, Britain, and the United States all recognized that the 
international community had responsibility, under the Declaration of Human Rights, to protect 
the Tutsi from humanitarian violations.  
The outbreak of violence following the plane crash on 6 April 1994 should not have 
come as a surprise to the international community. Historians of the genocide argue that the 
international community and the United Nations knew prior to 6 April that the Hutu had already 
                                                 
203
 Christian Hoche, “Rwanda: Les Raisons d’un Massacre,” L’Express, April 21, 1994. 
204
 Elaine Sciolino, “For West, Rwanda is not Worth the Political Candle,” The New York Times, April 15. 1994. 
 48 
planned the massacres and executions of the Tutsi. Between 8 and 17 April 1993, Waly Bacre 
Ndiaye, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions of the 
Commission for Human Rights visited Rwanda and concluded that “serious human rights 
violations were taking place and that there was a risk of genocide.”205 Ndiaye later commented 
that, with the attention actually given to the report, he might as well have thrown it into the 
sea.
206
 In January 1994, a United States government intelligence analyst stated that if conflict 
restarted in Rwanda, “the worst case scenario would involve one-half million people dying.”207 
And during that same time, the “Genocide Cable” written by Major-General Romeo Dallaire 
notified the United Nations that the Rwandan government was training Interahamwe in camps to 
kill Tutsi quickly. This cable went to all major Western countries, yet all chose to ignore the 
signs it presented.
208
  
 These reports and cables were sent to the United Nations and the rest of the international 
community while Hutu extremists armed for a massive extermination, right in front of the world. 
UN peacekeepers in the country, prior to the genocide, commented that the Hutu government 
created major weapons stockpiles around Kigali. The militia expanded as well. Invoices and 
bank statements show that the Rwandan government made deals with many Western nations to 
acquire mass amounts of machetes and other agricultural tools. The government purchased these 
weapons in 1993 from Western donors under contracts that they would “not be used for military 
or paramilitary purposes.”209 A CIA report from 1993 found that almost four million tons of 
small arms were transferred to Rwanda from Poland, via Belgium.
210
 At the beginning of the 
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genocide, the Hutu distributed an estimated eighty five million tons of munitions throughout the 
country.   
 When the violence erupted in April, the international community looked on in disbelief 
because they felt unable to act even though the Western world did have knowledge of impending 
violence within Rwanda. In the first few weeks of the genocide, the media recognized that there 
was a lack of actual action because the international community did not actually know how to get 
involved; the situation was too incomprehensible to begin to know how to engage. A 23 July 
article from The Economist stated “The disaster that has overtaken Rwanda is too big to 
comprehend. But, that does not excuse inaction.”211 Rwanda was a “crucible full of explosives 
that nations watching from a comfortable distance have no idea how to handle.”212 An article in 
The New York Times, appearing just a week after the violence began, explained that the fighting 
was just too intense within Rwanda and the international community could do little to stop the 
violence.
213
 And after an effort was made to evacuate citizens of other countries, a Time article 
stated that “the Western troops could barely manage to protect their own countrymen” and 
therefore did not have the resources to cope with the Rwandans.
214
 
The media highly criticized the removal of expatriates and juxtaposed it with the horror 
of the situation with the Tutsi. “The killings take place casually, under the noses of UN, French, 
and Belgian troops, within the range of television cameras, and just yards away from expatriates 
being evacuated.”215 This juxtaposition became a criticism of the international community but 
also an example of the severity of the violence going on. “But while they loaded Europeans on to 
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planes bound for the airport, Rwandan corpses piled up along the routes.”216 The media’s 
criticism of the removal of foreign personnel showed that the main priority for the international 
community was their citizens, not the protection of Rwandan lives. 
As the genocide went on, the media became adamantly more critical of the lack of 
international intervention. An 18 June article in The Economist made the lack of effort an 
embarrassment to the international community. The article explains that the African world had 
come to the aid of Rwanda whereas the “rich world, to its shame, has not.” The article continues 
by explaining the preposterousness of not even being able to effectively supply arms to the UN 
forces within the country. A 18 June article from The Econimist stated “This is pathetic: It is 
impossible to believe that an over-armed world, if it had the will, couldn’t find ready-to-use 
armoured cars to spare, and get them to Rwanda quickly.”217 Desperation and anxiousness came 
from the French press as well. “The Rwandan tragedy is not a tragedy of Africa, or at least not 
only, but first and foremost, it is the bloodiest conflict of the late century, for which the duty to 
intervene fell on humanity.”218 And the media emphasized how humanity failed to take charge of 
their responsibility.  
The international community had a responsibility to intervene in Rwanda and protect 
human life, and the Western media recognized that fact. When one country finally did stand up 
and intervene, the media offered praise and admiration.    
  
The Case of France 
Throughout the four months of genocide, the media remained critical of the international 
community as a whole for their lack of intervention. But, the media from one major country 
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celebrated their personal responsibility amid a world that shunned their own. The French media 
celebrated French efforts in Rwanda and held their moral responsibility in high regard, especially 
when compared to their Western counterparts. France has a long reputation of universalism when 
it comes to Africa. Their relationship with Africa, both during colonialism and after 
decolonization, kept the French involved in the continent and the French took on the role and 
reputation as protectors of the continent.  
France’s position as a protector of human rights is highlighted throughout the articles in 
the French press. Many times, the media framed France as a paternal figure to Rwanda. France 
had to “maintain its commitments and its responsibilities”219 because of their stance on human 
rights violations. Operation Turquoise was a “mission entrusted to them.”220  The media 
highlights the reaction of Rwandans when the French arrive. “And the kids sing in Kinyarwanda, 
an unexpected serenade, ‘France brings us peace. Machetes and stakes can no longer kill.’”221 A 
headline in Le Monde from June 26 following the start of Operation Turquoise reads, “Jubilation 
among Hutus, relief among Tutsis.”222 Again, this suggests that France brings relief with them to 
all people; therefore promoting France as a protector that is able to bring peace to the country.  
  The French media’s celebratory reporting of France has a lot to do with how France saw 
their place in the international community, as a leader of the effort to protect human rights. In an 
article in Le Monde, Alain Juppe, French Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, made the 
statement, “’In any case, I feel that once again, our country takes its responsibilities and – if you 
allow me this excess of immodesty – gives example.”223 In another article in Le Monde this 
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theme is shown again. “France is in a close relationship with Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali to study the contributions of the international community to the normalization of the 
situation.”224 By reiterating France’s position in the international community, the French media 
celebrated their responsibility to intervene within Rwanda. 
 Within the first two months of the genocide, international action in Rwanda was 
practically non-existent. It was not until Operation Turquoise that the Western world became 
directly involved in the country. And while the French media highly celebrated their country’s 
efforts, the international media also offered praise to France, at least at the beginning of the 
mission. The American media paid homage to the French for intervention by making the French 
seem like the most humane of the Western world. A New York Times report states that the French 
needed to intervene because “their stomachs could not stand it anymore” and that it “should 
embarrass Americans” because they have not followed the French lead.225 And as the Operation 
continued, The New York Times continued to praise the French effort. “Grant France this much 
credit for its armed intervention into the genocidal civil war” when there was an “inability of 
Washington and the United Nations.”226 
 The British media also offered praise to the French in spite of the tensions that come 
along with the Anglo-French dichotomy. Through the criticism, which mainly revolved around 
the French relationship with the Habyarimana regime and the Hutu, the British media still 
recognized that “the French have done more than anyone else to stop the slaughter.”227 And like 
the American news media, the British media used French initiative to criticize their own lack of 
action. An article in The Times highlights a quote from a French corporal in Rwanda. “’The 
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British know nothing about food and everything about war. Our history teaches us to view them 
with respect in this manner but we cannot respect people who will not come and stand by our 
side when we are sent on a mission to save lives.’”228 The British media, much more than the 
American media, does highly criticize the French and Operation Turquoise, but still, the media 
recognizes that the French had at least made an effort at intervention.  
 The Western news media recognized that the international community had a 
responsibility to intervene in Rwanda. France finally took hold of that responsibility and made an 
effort at intervention with Operation Turquoise. The media portrayal of international 
responsibility demonstrates that the Western world knew that something needed to be done. It 
was a moral responsibility for the international community to stop humanitarian violations, but 
still, the West did little to nothing. Recognition of responsibility by the media took a turn in the 
media towards placing blame on others, and in one case, on their home governments, and mostly 
on the United Nations. This turn in the media represents the complications of interpreting human 
rights legislation.    
 
Blame  
 A common trend throughout the media of all three countries was the theme of blame. The 
media, at many times, took to identifying the faults of Western governments in their inaction. 
This is especially true of the United States. The United States was the most vocal in rejecting 
intervention and seeking to prevent others in aid efforts. But most of the blame from the media 
was put on the United Nations as a whole. The media criticism of the United Nations and the 
ability to place the blame on the collective, helped individual countries pass on their 
responsibility concerning Rwanda onto the larger entity.  
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 This movement to place blame on the United Nations exemplifies how human rights 
legislation and implementation can be precarious. While all three countries signed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and sit as permanent members of the UN Security Council, all 
three were willing to shift personal responsibility onto the collective. This leaves the question of 
who actually is responsible for interfering when human rights are being violated. By placing the 
blame on the collective, each country is able to leave their personal vendettas and relationships 
with Rwanda out of the picture. The responsibility of intervention falls on the UN as a whole, 
and single countries can absolve blame for inaction.  
 
The Case of the United States 
Just four days after President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, a New York Times 
article shows exactly how the United States would take a stance on Rwanda. “The President 
[Clinton] stressed to them the importance of doing everything possible to insure the safety of 
Americans, and doing whatever we could – which frankly isn’t very much- to stabilize the 
situation in Rwanda.”229 Early on in the genocide, it was clear that the United States would be 
one of the more reluctant Western nations to get involved. And the Western media highly 
criticized the contentions held by the United States, both from abroad and from the American 
media as well.  
The United States government held a special position when it came to the situation in 
Rwanda. Just the year before, the United States lost eighteen elite troops in Mogadishu under UN 
mandate on what had originally been deemed a peacekeeping mission.
230
 Somalia was arguably 
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“the greatest military humiliation for America since Vietnam.”231 In the shadow of that event, the 
United States was far from willing to get directly involved once the situation in Rwanda began. 
“’Anytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa,’ one US official remembers, ‘the crucifixes 
and garlic would come up on every door.’”232 Even before the genocide broke out, the United 
States was wary of even acknowledging escalating violence within Rwanda. When the Defense 
Department’s African affairs bureau recommended that the Pentagon consider adding Rwanda-
Burundi to the list of potential trouble spots, the reply was “Look, if something happens in 
Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list…Just make it go away.”233 The media from 
all three countries, the United States included, criticized the Clinton administration’s hesitation 
to get involved in another African conflict even as the violence and death tolls grew in Rwanda.  
The media from Europe continually criticized the United States for their lack of 
intervention and their desire to combat any UN intervention within Rwanda, especially the 
French press. In the first few weeks, the British media recognized the importance of the United 
States in achieving an involved international community. America did not need to be involved in 
every UN mission but their reluctance with Rwanda “encourages others to copy its unsupportive 
style.” And unfortunately “America is not among the committed governments.”234 The French 
used Somalia to mock the United States’ precautions with involvement in Rwanda. The French 
media accentuated this fear by the US and used it to the advantage of promoting French 
initiative. “The United States, stung by their disappointment in Somalia (they lost 39 men), have 
vowed not to set foot there again.”235 The L’Express journalists’ statistics on how many men 
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were lost in Somalia make US fears seem invalid and a bit over exaggerated, considering they 
lost on thirty-nine men.  
The United States went further than just refusing direct intervention of American troops. 
The United States government continually called for a reduction in UN support and intervention 
efforts. Immediately after President Habyarimana’s plane crashed, the United States determined 
that there was no benefit of a peacekeeping mission. On 15 April, the Clinton administration told 
the Security Council that a peacekeeping effort served “no useful role” in the present situation.236 
Washington demanded the withdrawal of peacekeepers mandated by the UN and then refused to 
authorize UN reinforcements for deployment to Rwanda.
237
 Even as the situation in Rwanda 
worsened, the United States still only pledged artillery and vehicles, but even those came with a 
cost to the UN.
238
 Cooperation efforts of the United States concerning humanitarian intervention 
did not come easily. President Clinton knew that involving American troops in another bloody 
conflict in Africa could have deadly results, much like in Somalia, so once again, the United 
States stood on the sidelines.
239
  
The French media vocalized their disdain for the actions of the United States when it 
came to cooperating with the UN. On 23 April, a report about how the UN planned to reduce 
presence to a strict minimum stated, “Washington suggests a total abandon.”240 Le Monde 
continued the criticism of the United States when it came to their relationship with UN 
humanitarian missions later in June. “The timidity of the US against the Rwandan tragedy is 
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consistent with their political participation of the UN abroad.”241 And later, when the French 
were committed to Operation Turquoise, the media continued to criticize how the US did not 
support any UN mandate. “France has committed difficult action in Rwanda. In any way she can 
oblige, in any way it is assured success. Europe, despite a few exceptions, have not followed, the 
US distant.”242  
In turn, the British media remained mostly silent on their criticisms of the United States. 
British criticism focused more on the United Nations as a whole. The French criticisms of the US 
are deeply rooted in French ideology concerning the Anglo-French dichotomy. As Daniela 
Kroslak says, the Anglo-French relationship is not so much “turned against the United Kingdom” 
as it is a fear of “the undesirable spread of American influence on the African continent.”243 This 
helps explains the French media attack on the United States and the fact that the media singled 
them out. 
The international community, including the media, highly criticized the United States 
during the genocide. But the American media also offered criticism of their own country. But, 
when criticism of the United States and their unwillingness for involvement appeared in the 
media, the media always placed the United States within the larger context of the United Nations 
and the rest of the international community. “Given the fact that there is no political will, either 
in Washington or other capitals, to intervene, the American strategy is to keep expectations as 
low as possible.”244  Comparing Washington to other capitals demonstrates how the American 
media grouped the actions of the United States with others in order to avoid direct criticism.  
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The memory of Somalia existed within the American media as well. “Somalia cooled the 
impulse to rescue innocent victims.”245 When it came to Somalia, the media took its lead from 
the United States government. One of the strongest voices on relating Rwanda to Somalia was 
President Clinton. When asked about intervention into Rwanda, he replied, “Lesson number one 
is, don’t go into one of these things and say, as the US said when we started in Somalia, ‘Maybe 
we’ll be done in a month because it’s a humanitarian crisis’…Because there are almost always 
political problems and sometimes military conflicts, which bring about these crises.”246 And the 
media followed suit with the president. “But to enter this conflict without a defined mission or a 
plausible military plan risks a repetition of the debacle in Somalia.”247 Time also vocalized how 
Somalia affected the United States involvement in Rwanda. “The American appetite for such 
missions, even in cases of dire human need has been dulled by experiences like Somalia.”248 The 
ghosts of Somalia trickled into the American media as well as the American government.  
As the genocide progressed into June and July, the media began to recognize that the 
United States was at fault for some of the United Nations forebodings. An article of 15 June, 
described the United States as the United Nations’ “leading deadbeat.”249 Two weeks later, in an 
opinion piece, the author described the United States by stating, “We are the richest country in 
the world. We are hanging around the UN bar, looking for a free drink and acting as if we are 
buying the rounds on the house.”250 Even though the American media recognized that the United 
States hindered the United Nations, the media from the United States, as well as from France and 
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Britain, placed most of the blame, and responsibility, on the collective for intervention, the 
United Nations. 
 
The United Nations 
The media from France, Britain, and the United States all follow a similar trend in the 
reporting of the genocide. All three countries placed the largest blame on the United Nations for 
the situation in Rwanda. Although all three countries hold permanent seats on the United Nations 
Security Council, and therefore hold responsibility in the decisions of the United Nations, the 
media from all three countries turned the attention onto the United Nations as a whole when it 
came to action, or lack thereof, in Rwanda during the genocide. By focusing on the United 
Nations as a whole, the media was able to shift the blame away from their home countries and 
protect their image when it came to their responsibility of humanitarian intervention and the 
protection of human rights.  
The United Nations committed to Rwanda before the genocide began, at least half-
heartedly. In August 1993, the Habyarimana government and the RPF signed the Arusha 
Accords in Arusha, Tanzania. The Accords called to merge the Rwandan government and the 
RPF. It called for a transitional government and a merger of the two militaries. Some considered 
the Arusha Accords “one of the best deals negotiated in Africa.”251 The United Nations became 
directly involved in Rwanda in 1993. On 5 October, the United Nations approved The United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UN meant UNAMIR to be a 
minimalist peacekeeping mission despite the fact that the situation in Rwanda was growing more 
and more dangerous. UNAMIR was doomed from its inception. It was highly under financed due 
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to the demands of the cost conscious United States.
252
  The mission was “run on a shoestring;” it 
was equipped with hand me down vehicles from the United Nations mission in Cambodia and 
when medical supplies ran out in March 1994, there was simply “no cash for resupply.”253  
In the beginning on 1994, it was clear that the Arusha Accords were crumbling and 
UNAMIR was in trouble. The United States argued firmly for a complete abandon of UNAMIR. 
On 5 April 1994, the Security Council met to discuss the withdrawal or extension of the mission. 
Unless there was going to be complete adherence from both sides to the Arusha Accords, 
UNAMIR would be pulled out of the country.
254
 But just a few hours later, the genocide had 
begun.   
The media remained highly critical of the UNAMIR during the course of the genocide, 
especially with the reduction of the mission. “UNAMIR should instead have a clear mandate to 
stop the massacres, to disarm and to oppose all military forces which take hold of the civilian 
population as targets on the basis of kill lists established a long time ago.”255 When UNAMIR 
should have been reinforced, the UN voted to reduce it. On 21 April 1994, the Security Council 
voted to drastically reduce UNAMIR and leave behind only a handful of UN peacekeepers that 
were left helpless in an impossible situation.
256
 A New York Times article from April 22, just the 
day after the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR, stated “the symbolic force the Security 
Council may be about to authorize would be a thin veil over another massacre.”257 And once the 
Security Council reduced UNAMIR, “there [was] now no effective international force for ending 
it.”258 The British media vocalized criticism of the reduction of UNAMIR as well. “[UN 
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Peacekeepers] stand by helplessly as the killing goes on. They have a limited mandate, and are 
only lightly armed; they cannot intervene in the fighting.”259 A Times article described the 
situation as the “UN peacekeepers were merely on holiday.”260 While UNAMIR and the 
reduction of it just when it was needed the most is highly criticized by the media, there is also a 
large criticism of the United Nations as a whole and their inability to be effective in humanitarian 
situations in general.  
When the media mentioned intervention, they grouped responsibility under the United 
Nations as a whole. Rwanda is the “moral responsibility” for the United Nations.261 And the 
criticisms of the United Nations, at times, are quite harsh. “As to the UN, who cares about its 
resolutions and its existence? It is just there, a pure formality, not to despair completely, to 
believe that maybe one day something to come out of it would not be totally useless.”262 
Occasionally the media grouped the failure with Rwanda with other failures by the United 
Nations. “Mortification is painfully familiar to the United Nations these days.” The following 
paragraph described all of the United Nations recently botched jobs such as Bosnia and Angola. 
The article continued with “But never has the shame been sharper than in the past few weeks in 
Rwanda…If it can do nothing in Rwanda, what is the world’s policeman able to do?”263 The 
media also expressed sympathy for the Tutsi to contrast the lack of action by the United Nations. 
“The best hope for the Tutsi is a victory by the RPF, not the United Nations.”264 An article in Le 
Monde directly quoted a Tutsi in Kigali after the reduction of UNAMIR, “’Now that the Blue 
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Helmets are about to leave, they will be able to kill us alone.’”265 The media remained very 
critical of the United Nations and their actions throughout the genocide.  
The international media also used the United Nations as a scapegoat for their own 
country’s inaction. The United States media continually reiterated that the Clinton administration 
is “wary” to put American troops at the hands of the United Nations for fear that they will not be 
used properly.
266
 The New York Times also quotes State Department Spokesperson Michael 
McCurry in the discussion of where humanitarian intervention will take place. “[It] will be under 
review at the United Nations, and that’s appropriately the place where that discussion will 
occur.”267 By continually shifting the United States responsibility of action into the hands of the 
United Nations, the media was able to take direct responsibility away from the United States 
government.  
The French media also used the United Nations as an excuse for France’s inaction. The 
media perpetuated the illusion that the United Nations purposely tried to block French initiative 
within Rwanda.  On 15 May, a report in Le Monde made it clear that France was willing to 
respond to any request by the UN Security Council for intervention.
268
 Later, when France did 
take the initiative to intervene with Operation Turquoise, the media ridiculed the UN for trying to 
stop their plans. On 18 June, a front-page headline read, “The French project of intervention to 
Rwanda hit with diplomatic obstacles.” The article that followed explains how the UN attempted 
to stop any French initiative to aid in Rwanda.
269
 Those “diplomatic obstacles” refer to the UN 
blocking French efforts to intervene within Rwanda. 
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 “So long as that is true, governments will increasingly dump problems in the UN’s lap 
only when they want an excuse to do nothing.”270 The criticism of the United Nations by the 
media of all three countries helps to contextualize the situation in Rwanda. By making the 
genocide the United Nations problem, the international community escaped direct responsibility 
for letting genocide take place. This shift in responsibility exacerbates the pitfalls of human 
rights legislation within in the international community.  
  
 
Conclusion 
The Western media took two different approaches to the role of international intervention 
during the Rwandan genocide. The media from all three countries recognized throughout the 
genocide that the international community held a responsibility to intervene in Rwanda and 
protect against humanitarian violations. And when intervention did happen, such as the case of 
Operation Turquoise, the media celebrated the effort. But in response to the recognition of 
responsibility, the media also turned the genocide into a blame-game. By pointing fingers at what 
others were not doing, the media took the attention off of their own country. Or, in the case of 
the United States, the media showed how the Clinton administration was to blame for the lack of 
intervention by the international community.  
The media’s reactions to international responsibility demonstrated how the Rwandan 
genocide became more than just an isolated event. The genocide came to show the problems and 
contradictions with human rights legislation and regulation in a world where human rights is 
supposedly so highly protected. The long-standing problems with human rights legislation, 
dating back to its inception, still existed in the Rwandan genocide. The problems with colonial 
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legacies concerning racism and Western dominance, combined with the ambiguity of 
international human rights legislation led to a confusing and complex environment that the 
reporters attempted to make sense of in the summer of 1994.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE TERM GENOCIDE 
 
The term genocide, much like the concept of human rights, comes with much complexity. 
The international community during the time of the genocide, from its start in April of 1994 and 
even into the months following the official end in July, shied away from acknowledging that 
genocide was taking place. The outside world portrayed the genocide as something else, “a 
senseless civil war, a tribal conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, in which old conflicts and bitter 
rivalries led to an almost primitive savagery.”271 For the international community and leadership 
to call the situation genocide was an admission that they had a responsibility to intervene as 
agreed upon in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The international community 
acknowledged genocide only in order to attack other countries and governments and their lack of 
inaction, or in order to glorify their own action in helping stop the genocide.  
 During the months of the genocide, the media took a critical yet sometimes complex 
stance on defining the situation in Rwanda as genocide. Two stances emerged within the news 
media during the time. Those two stances were the one that avoided the use of the word genocide 
and the other which was neither afraid nor hesitant to call the situation in Rwanda genocide. The 
emergence of two stances reflected the complexities of defining genocide and human rights in 
general. These two stances comingled with each other during the months of reporting and often 
times the position of the news source changed daily. The complexity and confused nature of the 
reporting concerning the use of the word genocide reflects the larger issue of human rights 
legislation. By defining the situation in Rwanda as genocide, or shying away from the term and 
maintaining that the situation was a civil war, the media perpetuated the difficulty in how the 
world understood, and still understands, human rights violations. And in turn, how the 
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international community can protect against those violations. 
The first stance that the media took shied away from the use of the word genocide and 
reflected the views of international leaders. While media from all three countries remained quick 
to describe the events in Rwanda horrifically and graphically to bring attention to the atrocities 
taking place, the media portrayed those events as products of a civil war. This stance of the news 
media acknowledged genocidal aspects, both outright and with word choice, but danced around 
the actual use of the term genocide. With this, the news media was able to make the situation in 
Rwanda more recognizable and familiar to the international community. Civil war is something 
that the average newsreader could understand and familiarize with. Genocide is complex and 
often inconceivable. 
 The other stance the media took sought to show the severity of the situation. This side of 
the reporting used shock value. These reporters were willing to describe the horrors that were 
taking place. They were willing to describe the bodies, the killings, and the mass graves. This 
side of the media was willing to use the word genocide.  They used graphic verbal imagery in 
order to shock the reader, and perhaps initiate international action within Rwanda to stop the 
violence.  
Troops and humanitarian workers in the country continually put out visual images to 
television media, but verbal imagery was also common within the written news media as well. 
Romeo Dallaire knew the importance of the media in order to gain support for a relief effort. He 
shuttled journalists and news reporters around Kigali whenever possible in the hopes that they 
would relay the horrors to the public. “’At that point,’ he recalls, ‘the journalists were really all I 
had.’”272 And those journalists did take those images that they saw and use them within their 
reporting in order to make the public understand the magnitude of the situation in Rwanda. They 
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used that imagery to describe the situation as what it was, genocide.  
This outlook of the media also related the genocide in Rwanda to something very 
recognizable to the international community, the Nazi Holocaust. By using language reminiscent 
of the Holocaust, the news media made the situation in Rwanda more understandable to the 
international readership. People knew the horrors of the Holocaust from education, books, and 
movies, and could relate that knowledge to the events in Rwanda.  
These two different stances, the one that recognized genocide and the one that shied away 
from it did not exist in a vacuum. The media represented the larger complexities of human rights. 
Not one media source remained true to solely one variation of the reporting. Especially, as time 
went on, and as the violence escalated and the death toll rose, the media became much more 
critical of the situation. The word genocide became much harder to shy away from, the severity 
of the situation became harder to ignore. But, ultimately, the media’s multiple stances and 
inconsistency demonstrate the problems with the use of the word genocide. They understood that 
genocide was a loaded word, and the media, much like the international community, were not 
entirely sure the appropriate time to use that word.  
 
A History of the Term “Genocide” 
 
Genocide, much like the concept of human rights, is a difficult word in terms of 
definition. It is a term that has only existed since the 1940s. Even the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights does not mention the word genocide anywhere in its thirty articles. The word 
genocide, like any other word, does in fact have a definition, but, like the term human rights, the 
definition is fluid and changing to fit the needs of its user. Defining genocide is complex and 
does not come with the best connotations. In essence, it is very controversial.  
 68 
 The international community created the word after World War II. When the world 
finally realized the full horror of the Holocaust, Winston Churchhill stated that the world was 
being faced with a “crime that has no name.”273 Shortly after Raphael Lemkin, a Polish born 
advisor to the United States War Ministry, in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, published 
in 1944, defined the Holocaust as “genocide.” The word derived from the Greek genos (race of 
tribe) and the Latin suffix cide (to kill).
274
 He defined “genocide” as “a coordinated plan of 
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, 
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”275 He believed that “mass murder” did not 
account for the motive behind such a horrific act therefore a new word had to be created.
276
 And 
from its creation, the word was controversial. Many people had a hard time conceptualizing a 
word that would describe such a horrible action.
277
 
Lemkin’s term became law on 9 December 1948 when the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.
278
 This law stipulates a responsibility to try to prevent and protect against genocide 
and to alleviate the suffering of genocidal victims.
279
 The text of the Convention does have many 
shortcomings. For example, Article I, which pledges prevention of genocide, offers very little on 
how to actually prevent genocide.
280
 The very definition of genocide is also disputed within the 
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document.
281
 Because of these ambiguities, the term has become both very commonplace and 
overused
282
 and also easily avoidable, as in the case of Rwanda.
283
 
One of the first historians to focus on the situation in Rwanda, as a genocide, was Alain 
Destexhe. In his monograph, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, published in 1995, 
just the year after the Rwandan genocide, Destexhe calls Rwanda one of the “three genuine 
examples of genocide during the course of the twentieth century” along with the Armenians by 
the Turks in 1915 and the Jews by the Nazis during the early 1940s.
284
 Destexhe argues that the 
term genocide has progressively lost its meaning through misuse and has become “dangerously 
commonplace,”285 but the situation in Rwanda adequately follows Lemkin’s original definition 
and meaning of the term.
286
 Even only a year after the genocide ended in Rwanda, Destexhe 
realized the complications with deeming the situation in Rwanda genocide and acknowledged 
that the international community failed to thoroughly explore the events in the country in the 
scope of possible genocide.  
Following suit, other historians and authors of the Rwandan genocide argue that the 
situation in Rwanda was genocide. Historian Linda Melvern, in her seminal work, blamed the 
international community by helping “create the conditions that made it [genocide] possible” in A 
People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide.287 Other historians, such as 
Mamhood Mamdani, have looked at the conditions that made genocide possible within the tiny 
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African country; what made neighbor kill neighbor?
288
 There is also a trend in the historiography 
of specializing on certain countries and their relationship to the genocide and how those different 
Western countries understood the situation in terms of genocide and how they turned their backs 
on Rwanda when it became obvious that genocide was taking place.
289
 These historians and 
authors, as well as many others, recognize what happened in Rwanda as genocide and critically 
analyze the situation and the international response in that manner.   
 
Making the Situation Relatable: “Civil War” and Genocidal Implications 
 The first aspect of the media coverage of Rwanda mirrored the flawed interpretations of 
the international leadership. This side of the coverage portrayed Rwanda as a civil war and 
downplayed the genocide. In essence, this side of the media reporting tended to dance around the 
issue by just focusing on the civil war that was taking place, relating the mass killings to 
products of war. This stance of the media reflects the difficulties in recognizing human rights 
issues and violations. Instead of acknowledging the genocide that was taking place, this side of 
the media focused on the aspects that were easier to understand. The idea of civil war is not 
uncommon when it comes to Africa. The public understands civil war and unrest in the 
continent. It is easier to digest than something so monumental as genocide. By only focusing on 
the civil war, this side of the media eliminated the confusion and uncertainness of what 
constitutes genocide. 
This side of the press coverage did little to help mobilization of responsive public 
opinion. “There were no headlines about genocide. There were graphic reports about corpses 
piling up on the streets and news stories about the scale of the killing, but there was little 
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explanation in the commentary.”290 This side of the media went along with the idea that this was 
tribal bloodletting and age-old conflict that was unable to be stopped by outside force. The first 
international inquiry into the media reported that the media had failed to adequately report the 
genocide and therefore gain public support and pressure on international governments for 
intervention.
291
 
 
Genocide versus civil war 
 Continually the news media referred to the situation in Rwanda as just a civil war. The 
situation in Rwanda was indeed part a civil war. The Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Hutu 
government were fighting a civil war for control of the country. But there are many instances 
within the news media where the genocide became lumped in as just a byproduct of the civil war. 
Casualties and death became just a result of the fighting. The news media did not recognize these 
deaths as part of the genocide that the Hutu were waging on the Tutsi, but rather, as a product of 
the civil war that the RPF and the Rwandan government fought.  
 The international leadership perpetuated the idea of Rwanda being merely a civil war 
throughout the world. This misguided the international community in their responsibility to step 
in and help save innocent lives. “Preoccupation with that [the civil war] blinded most 
commentators, governments, the UN Secretariat and Security Council to the fact of the genocidal 
killing perpetuated by one of the parties of the civil war.”292 Distinctions between the Rwandan 
military and the Interahamwe, the Hutu killing squads, became blurred and the two were often 
grouped together. Ultimately, confusion between the simultaneous civil war and genocide led to 
hundreds of thousands of Tutsi to lose their lives as the international community looked on.  
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And the media played an important role in grouping the civil war and the genocide into 
one event. By calling the events in Rwanda a civil war, the media made the situation more 
relatable to the public. Even when the reporters portrayed the violence as extensive, they also 
tended to treat it as typical.
293
 The term genocide is easily confused and not an idea that is easily 
understandable to the average newspaper reader. As seen above, the last real genocide that the 
world has seen was the Nazi Holocaust and that was fifty years prior to the Rwandan genocide. 
The Nazi Holocaust took place outside of the average newspaper reader in 1994’s lifetime or at 
least memory. Civil war, especially when related to Africa, became much more understandable 
and accepted in the international community in 1994. And while the imagery, both verbal and 
pictorial, coming from all news media outlets was horrific and gruesome; the public understood 
those images much better in the realm of civil war. 
Throughout the media Rwanda is simply called a “civil war.” In a 1 May article from The 
New York Times, Rwanda is a “civil war” and the article relates the violence to other countries in 
which civil conflict has occurred.
294
 In a later article, the reporter referred to Rwanda simply as 
“war-torn”295 and that is why the United States did not want to enter the country. Even at the end 
of the genocide, New York Times reporters still perpetuated the reference. “The civil war in 
Rwanda has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives over the last three months.”296 A 7 May 
article in The Economist relates Rwanda to other African countries, stating, “African civil wars 
are as hard to settle as any other.”297  And The Times began their coverage of the situation in 
Rwanda by writing of how “the central African state lurched back into civil war” after the plane 
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crash on 6 April.
298
 Later, the paper describes the dead as simply “victims of the civil war.”299 
An article in The New York Times also discusses the victims in terms related to war. “An 
estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people, mostly civilian, have been killed.”300 The term “civilian” 
directly references war thereby relating the deaths with the civil war. By relating the deaths to 
civil war, the media makes them no less tragic but much more relatable. The international 
community understands civil war, especially in the context of the African continent.  
This stance by the media does acknowledge the genocidal aspect of the situation in 
Rwanda, it is often treaded upon lightly. Phrases such as “the stench of genocide”301 
acknowledge what is happening in Rwanda could be genocide but avoided calling it genocide 
outright. Many times, the news media states things such as “acts of genocide may have 
occurred”302 or “the signs of genocide are everywhere.”303 Phrases and statements such as these 
do give light to the severity of the situation in Rwanda while still keeping the newsreader 
friendly and reader comprehensible.  
Ironically, as the media shied away from defining the situation in Rwanda as genocide, 
the news media continually criticized the international leadership for doing exactly the same 
thing. In most cases, the country attacked is the United States. Official State documentation from 
the Secretary of Defense dated 1 May sums up the Clinton Administration’s view on the use of 
the word genocide. In a report, next to the definition of “Genocide Investigation,” a note was 
made stating, “Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday – Genocide finding 
could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’”304 Throughout the months of 
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the genocide, the Clinton Administration, more than any other international government or 
organization, shunned the term genocide.  
And the media was highly critical of the United States government for doing so, even 
when the news media also turned away from direct use of the term. An 11 May article from The 
New York Times states “Governments hesitate to call the horror by its name, for to do so would 
oblige them to act.”305 Another article from 10 June criticized the Clinton administration because 
they had instructed spokespeople to not use the word “genocide” because ending the killing 
might not be worth American lives. The article later states “The Administrations cautious 
language nevertheless mirrors the standoffishness the United States has adopted.”306 The British 
media too attacked the United States government for their denial of genocide. “Mr. Clinton’s 
administration had taken months before it would even admit that genocide had occurred.”307  
The French news media criticized others in their denial and use of the word genocide. 
Very rarely do the French papers studied deny that genocide is taking place within Rwanda.  For 
example, an article from 19 June puts forth that “no man of good can ignore the ongoing 
genocide” in an article discussing how the United Nations is shying away from recognizing the 
true nature of the situation in Rwanda.
308
 The French media also continually reiterated that the 
United States “officials have been asked not to use the term genocide to escape obligation in 
such case by the UN Charter.”309 The French media, whether as an act of self-promotion or 
simply a strive for accurate reporting, coincides much more with the other stance taken by the 
media. 
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Shock Value: The use of verbal imagery and emphasis on genocide  
  Major media outlets, including the ones studied here, did continually describe the brutal 
images coming out of Rwanda during the time.
310
 This stance by the media was not afraid to use 
the word genocide, even with its murky and unclear implications. The use of verbal imagery, as 
well as photographs, showed the horrific nature of the situation in Rwanda and made clear that 
the situation was much more than just a civil war. A lot of this reporting began as more reporters 
and journalists entered into the country and saw for themselves the severity of the situation. One 
example is journalist Aiden Hartley of Reuters News Agency from Nairobi. He stated, “suddenly 
the truth dawned on me that there was a mad logic about it. The point was not to win the war but 
to wipe out the Tutsi,” after he witnessed massacres taking place within a church in Kigali.311  
This paralleled with the United Nations realization of the difference between the 
genocide and the civil war. It was not until the International Community of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) issued a statement to the Security Council that stated the severity of the massacres on 29 
April 1994. At that point Boutros Boutros-Ghali finally issued a letter to the Council President 
demanding that “forceful action” take place in order to “restore law and order and put an end to 
the massacres.” While he does not mention genocide outright, this is the first instance of the 
Security Council separating the civil war and the massacres.
312
 It was not until 31 May that the 
Security Council officially acknowledged Rwanda as genocide in a report based on information 
from Iqbal Riza and Maurice Baril, the Secretary-General’s military adviser, which was gathered 
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during a trip to Rwanda between 22-27 May. The report recognized the failure of the 
international community and the United Nations in a situation of genocide.
313
 
Besides the outright use of the word genocide, which can be seen throughout all of the 
news media sources, the media used two other techniques to show the public the truth about the 
situation in Rwanda. The media used verbal imagery in order to give the news about Rwanda 
realism. By graphically describing events in Rwanda, the reporters evoked sympathy and outrage 
from the public. Imagery made the horrors of the violence real. The media also used another 
technique to show that Rwanda was indeed genocide. Reporters and journalists related Rwanda 
to the most understood and recognizable genocide, the Nazi Holocaust. They related Rwanda to 
Nazi Germany both outright and with the use of language that is reminiscent of the Holocaust.  
 
The Use of Imagery  
 “God, no death is ok but to be killed like this, or to look like the living dead is 
unbelievable.”314 This statement came from a French soldier in Rwanda under Operation 
Turquoise. An article on 1 July from The Times states how “the tough French soldiers were 
clearly unprepared for the scale of the slaughter they saw.”315 When the French did arrive in 
Rwanda, they witnessed the extent of the situation. A report from The New York Times mentions 
that French soldiers urged reporters to film corpses. One French soldier told The New York Times 
reporter, “People need to see this.”316 Those that experienced the violence and death first hand 
played a large role in passing along the actuality of the situation in Rwanda. They felt the need to 
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show the outside world the horror of the atrocities that took place within Rwanda in order to gain 
public support for relief efforts by the international leadership.  
 Even before the French arrived in Rwanda, images and reports of the severity of what 
was happening in Rwanda flowed out of the country. One huge difference between Rwanda and 
other genocides, such as the Holocaust, is that the killing in Rwanda did not take place in gas 
chambers hidden from the public. The genocide in Rwanda took place on the streets and right in 
the public eye. The Hutu did not hide their intent or action, often times killing Tutsi right in front 
of foreigners and international relief. And radio stations, news networks, and the printed media 
broadcast the killing. “The images of crude barbarity relayed across the world, the machete 
attacks, the bodies floating down the river, corpses piled by the roadside, seemed to confirm the 
atavistic nature of the killing.”317 The news media used graphic verbal imagery in order to relay 
the severity of the situation in Rwanda and try and gain public support for intervention. 
 There are countless mentions of the magnitude of the violence throughout the news 
media studied here. One trick that the news media used in order to make the violence more 
relatable was to focus on single events or victims among the thousands. This technique made the 
reader able to connect with the violence on a personal level. And many times, the articles 
focused on women and children due to their reputation of vulnerability. An article in L’Express 
focuses on sixteen-year-old Fred Mullisa “rotting in the swamp, feeding himself with grass. The 
militias cut off his hand. A gaping wound on his right leg, swollen with gangrene. Fred speaks. A 
thin voice out of this bruised body.”318 A Time Magazine article focuses on Rayontina 
Mukansonera, a nineteen-year-old Tutsi girl that describes being raped repeatedly by the Hutu 
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militiamen. “’They showed no mercy,’” she told reporters.319 These are just a few of the 
multitude of stories focusing on women and children within the news media. The news media 
was able to gain sympathy and attention by using the vulnerability of the women and children 
victims.  
 The news media also used the verbal imagery of severed bodies and the multitude of 
corpses in order to help the reader understand the magnitude of the situation. “There were too 
many dead bodies: too many on the roads, too many corpses sharing beds with the living, too 
many scattered among the banana groves.”320 A Time Magazine article describes “Severed heads 
and limbs piled up on street corners, the smell of decay fouling the air. No matter how many 
bodies Red Cross workers collected, more appeared.”321 Many times, graphic images of corpses 
accompanied these articles, especially in the weekly periodicals. By describing the numbers of 
bodies, and showing them as “piles” or in “mass graves,” the reporters are able to relay the 
magnitude of the death that took place within Rwanda, and therefore garner public support.  
 The news media also used vivid verbal imagery of the Hutu militias. The descriptions 
make the militiamen animalistic. The reporters dehumanized them in order to portray them as 
barbaric. By dehumanizing the militiamen, the reporters were able to make their horrific deeds 
understandable to the public because their acts were so unimaginable that people could not 
fathom how humans could do this to one another. “And just round the corner, glassy-eyed, 
hostile young men operate an impromptu road-block. Some wear the uniform of the Rwandan 
army; many do not. They wield machetes, clubs or automatic weapons. They use them without 
mercy or second thoughts, fuelled by cane liquor and banana beer, greed and tribal hatred.”322  
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An L’Express article stated “only youth militia, armed to the teeth, patrolling, set up roadblocks 
when they are not needed for pillaging. Often drenched in beer, with bloodshot eyes, they are 
unpredictable.”323 The militiamen are made out as bloodthirsty animals in order for the 
international public community to hate them and garner support for international intervention. 
 And the media’s use of imagery did have its effect on the public. The news media from 
all three countries acknowledged that the images coming from Rwanda moved the public. “The 
public, seeing horrors on its television screen, feels strongly that someone ought to do something 
when thousands of people are being killed or are starving to death.”324 Pictures and imagery 
coming out of Rwanda also pushed the international public to donate money for aid reliefs. An 
article in The Times focused solely on how harrowing pictures touched British hearts and purses 
and there were large donations being made to relief organizations.
325
  
By the end of the genocide, public opinion had affected international effort. “In April, 
when the disaster in Rwanda was already in the making, the United Nations did little and the 
Western powers, nothing at all.” But at the end of the genocide, the West was vying to do all it 
could because “people have seen the pictures, and want action to be taken.”326 Images and 
imagery caused public outrage when it came to the situation in Rwanda. Public opinion toward 
the United Nations and international governments at the end of the genocide was very 
unfavorable and outraged that the Western world could sit back and watch genocide unfold 
before their eyes. 
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Relation to the Holocaust 
 Besides the outright use of the word genocide, the media also used the best-known 
genocide as a source of comparison. The term genocide came out of the Nazi Holocaust during 
World War II. So it is only expected that the Rwandan genocide become contextualized within 
that frame. “The Tutsi were killed as a group, recalling German designs to extinguish the 
country’s Jewish population. This explicit goal is why the killings of Tutsi between March and 
July of 1994 must be termed ‘genocide.’ This single fact underlines a crucial similarity between 
the Rwandan genocide and the Nazi Holocaust.”327 There is a contrast with the Holocaust and the 
Rwandan genocide that makes their relationship much more gruesome and inexcusable from the 
standpoint of the international community’s lack of intervention. “But, unlike the Holocaust, far 
from trying to conceal what was happening, the killing took place in broad daylight.”328 The 
media relating the Rwandan genocide to the Holocaust and the methods used in the Holocaust 
help contextualize the situation in Rwanda as genocide. 
 Within the news media, there is some direct comparison to the Holocaust. But mostly, the 
media uses the language and wordage that is most commonly associated with the Holocaust. 
Words such as “extermination” conjure images of the Nazi Holocaust and have been popularized 
by seminal works in Nazi historiography. Calling the Hutu “executioners” and describing the 
killings as “executions” also helps visualize the situation in Rwanda in terms of the Holocaust.329 
The use of verbal imagery was also effective in the media representation of Rwanda as another 
Holocaust. Descriptions of mass graves and concentration camps stir up the memories of the 
Nazi Holocaust.  
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The media recognized the systematic nature of the killing in Rwanda of the Tutsi, much 
like the Jews by the Nazis. A New York Times article from 3 June described the death of Tutsi as 
a “campaign to exterminate” and stated, “they [Tutsi] were methodically hunted down.”330 Time 
Magazine recognized early on the ethnic quality to the murders. An article from 25 April 
mentions that “many of the 20,000 victims died simply because they were Tutsi.”331 Murder 
based on ethnicity or race relates directly with how the Holocaust unfolded. And while the 
American media recognized these comparisons to the methodology of the Holocaust, the United 
States government continued to deny the genocide was taking place. 
The British media also continued the imagery of the Holocaust within the reporting. An 
Economist report from 21 May described “mass graves” and “Hutu death squads” in an article 
that opens with the statement, “The signs of genocide are everywhere.”332 In the following issue, 
a reporter states, “this was no spontaneous explosion of tribal violence, but a calculated attempt 
to get rid of an entire people.”333 The daily British media also acknowledged the relation to the 
Holocaust. As early as April, just three weeks after the genocide began, The Times recognized 
that “an extermination” was taking place.334 And throughout the articles during the months of 
violence, The Times reporters make references to such things as “concentration camps”335 and 
the Tutsi looking like “the living dead.”336 The Times even went as far as to mock the 
international community’s promises made after the Holocaust in a 4 May advertisement titled 
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“Never Again?”337 The British media, out of the three Western nations, was the most liberal with 
the term genocide and the relations between Rwanda and the Nazi Holocaust. 
The French media also used the relationship between the Rwandan genocide and the Nazi 
Holocaust to describe the situation in Rwanda. And the French had a unique position on the topic 
because they had French troops on the ground during the genocide under Operation Turquoise. 
L’Express described “mass graves”338 and often times featured photography of those graves. The 
killing was often times described as “execution” and stories of Hutu “executioners”339 and “death 
squads”340 ran throughout the articles featured in the news magazine. Le Monde also perpetuated 
the language of genocide by the usage of words such as “extermination”341 and featured ads 
within the paper entitled “Help Rwanda” which discussed “methodological extermination plans” 
and “kill lists.”342 The French had a unique role in the situation in Rwanda due to their past 
relationship and Operation Turquoise, but their media followed suit with British and American 
media when it came to contextualizing the situation in Rwanda with the Nazi Holocaust. 
 
Conclusion 
 The term genocide in reference to Rwanda was, in itself, controversial. That one word 
determined and justified international response and action in Rwanda during those four months. 
The media took on a complex role when it came to the idea and implementation of reporting 
Rwanda as genocide. Two stances emerged within the reports. The first followed along with the 
international leadership. This side did not use the word genocide and instead focused on Rwanda 
as a civil war. By calling the situation in Rwanda a civil war, made Rwanda more relatable to the 
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public readership. This side of the media was the side that wanted to leave Rwanda alone and 
stay uninvolved, much like the Western powers. 
 Luckily, there was another stance of the media that was present during the genocide in 
Rwanda. And that side was not afraid to call the situation in Rwanda by its rightful name. 
Besides outright using the term genocide, this side of the media also portrayed the horrors of 
Rwanda with vivid imagery and graphic description, even relating it to the most recognizable 
occurrences of genocide. This side of the media was able to sway public opinion and create a 
public force that demanded for intervention and action by the international leadership. And, 
within the news media studied, this side of the media overshadowed the side that denied 
genocide. 
 The fact that two different sides of reporting came out during the Rwandan genocide 
mirrors the larger problems with understanding genocide, and human rights. Because the concept 
of human rights is fluid and hard to define, genocide and response to it are complex. The 
Western world had a reason to shy away from outright proclaiming Rwanda as genocide. 
Deeming the situation genocide would have required international action and response. But even 
defining genocide just to label a situation is tricky and complex due to the ambiguity of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights legislation. And the media fell 
prey to that and demonstrated the complicated nature of protecting human rights.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
On 18 July, the last Hutu stronghold fell to RPF troops and the civil war was declared 
over. But, the country was in shambles. In Kigali, an estimated 50,000 people remained from a 
pre-genocide population of 300,000, and over half of those that remained had been displaced. 
And their conditions were disastrous. The perpetrators of genocide had ransacked the entire 
country. There was no clean water, no medical supplies, and few adequate food sources. There 
was also the problem of rotting bodies piled throughout the country.
343
 In the months following 
the genocide, the media attention concerning Rwanda turned to the refugee problem. As the RPF 
gained control of the country, the Hutu fled in fear of retribution. Over two million Hutu crossed 
into the neighboring countries of Congo and Tanzania in the final days of the genocide and the 
first days of the Kagame regime.
344
 The media focused heavily on the worsening conditions in 
refugee camps and the outbreak of disease. The refugee crisis in itself was a humanitarian 
nightmare adamantly covered by news sources.  
It was not until the years following the genocide that the international community began 
to come to terms with the Rwandan genocide. In 1998, United States President Bill Clinton 
visited Kigali. During a speech given to genocide survivors at the Kigali airport on 25 March, 
President Clinton stated, 
The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of 
responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing 
began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the 
killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.
345
 
 
Six weeks later, in a speech directed at the Parliament of Rwanda, United Nations Secretary 
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General Kofi Annan stated,  
Rwanda's tragedy was the world's tragedy. All of us who cared about Rwanda, all of us 
who witnessed its suffering, fervently wish that we could have prevented the 
genocide…We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the 
people of Rwanda.
346
 
 
International guilt continued years after the genocide ended. The genocide still heavily affects 
Rwanda and the international community into the present day.  
 The summer of 2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide. All the 
media sources analyzed above featured commemorative pieces about the event. While those 
articles fall outside the scope of this thesis, their adherence to commemorating Rwanda 
demonstrate how the Western world is still engaged with the genocide. The Western media 
played a very important role during the summer of 1994 in bringing the genocide to the public. 
The Rwandan genocide happened in an age of technology, where the international community 
could be directly engaged in the action. The way the media portrayed the genocide influenced 
how the international public understood and contextualized such a horrific event. 
 The media from France, Britain, and the United States did vary by country. For instance, 
the British media was much more liberal with the term genocide whereas the American media, 
for reasons of their own, shied away from it. The French media used their accomplishments with 
Operation Turquoise in order to bolster the country’s psyche while other countries’ media 
pushed their responsibility onto the shoulders of the UN as a whole. But, while each country’s 
media differed slightly, the media sources from all three countries shared larger themes.  
 Larger issues heavily influenced the media from all three countries during the months of 
the genocide. Those larger issues – the legacies of colonialism and the complexities of human 
rights – were woven into the media reports on Rwanda. The legacies of colonialism helped 
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reporters define the events taking place within Rwanda in a larger context that made those events 
understandable. Rwanda is not a country ridden of its colonial past, and the Western reporters 
used colonial and neo-colonial connections to interpret and portray the reasons behind the 
genocide and civil war. The reporters themselves also became part of the larger colonial 
narrative by perpetuating the notion of Western dominance over Africa through the use of racist 
language and imagery. They perpetuated the racism that they claimed to reject. The reporting 
also shows how complicated the issue of colonialism remains even years after decolonization. 
The Rwandan Genocide envenomed the problems between the Western world and formerly 
colonized countries.    
 The Western media also exacerbated the difficulties and intricacies of human rights 
legislation and implementation. The complicated nature of allotting blame and assigning 
responsibility by the media demonstrated how fluid the responsibility of human rights protection 
is upon the world stage. The media used human rights protection both as a badge of honor and as 
ammunition in regard to the need for intervention. Part of this multifaceted entity became the use 
of the word “genocide” by the Western media. Often times, the Western media, like the 
international leadership, met difficulties and ambiguities in using the loaded word. The word 
genocide equates responsibility. The word within the media became both a source of denial and 
reckoning. The Rwandan Genocide demonstrated the complex nature of human rights protection 
within the media and the international community.     
 The media sources examined in this thesis demonstrate how the Rwandan genocide needs 
to be understood in the larger context of the West’s relationship with Africa. In order to 
understand and aid in future conflicts on the African continent, the West needs to acknowledge 
 87 
the larger issues of racial legacies and ambiguities of international human rights legislation. In 
doing so, the Western world may be able to save millions of innocent lives. 
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